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ABSTRACT 
 
Today, global environmental problems have become one of the most important international 
issues. The current Master’s thesis is about international environmental and political cooperation 
in the Baltic Sea Region after World War II. The Baltic Sea is surrounded by nine states and the 
degradation of the marine environment of the Baltic Sea has become a common problem. 
However, international environmental cooperation depends on many political factors: financial 
support, international organizations, attitude of states, international law and status of 
environmental issues in the international arena. The Master’s thesis focuses on different forms of 
political cooperation which have influenced international governance in the Baltic Sea area. 
These forms of political cooperation include the Cold War political situation, the division 
between the East and the West, increased cooperation after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
Helsinki Commission and the European Union. International environmental cooperation needs 
appropriate political environment where states around a sea have incentives and will to protect 
the environment. The Baltic Sea is a good example of international governance of maritime 
environment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The political map of the world where we live today is not composed only of nation-states dealing 
with their narrow national interests. The world has become much more global and international 
in political, environmental (global warming, maritime pollution) and economic terms. There are 
also regions where states in the same area, on the same coast or around the same sea have similar 
environmental problems. Geography and belonging to a certain region, international organization 
or environmental regime forces states to act in certain ways. However, there are different factors 
which influence cooperation among states in the region or regime: for example, political 
situation, different economies or unequal level of political development. 
 The current Master’s thesis is about political cooperation and international environmental 
governance in the Baltic Sea Region after World War II. Why is this subject important? Most of 
all, the Baltic Sea Region is unique one. The Baltic Sea marine environment is extremely 
sensitive, fragile and vulnerable ecosystem as the sea is a shallow, enclosed and brackish water 
basin. At the same time, the Baltic Sea is under severe stress from pollution and human 
activities, including industries and shipping. There were serious signs of the environmental 
degradation of the Baltic Sea already at the end of the 1960s.  
On the other hand, the Baltic Sea is fragmented politically: there are nine states around 
the sea. Historically, the Baltic Sea area has long been a region of cooperation, shipping and 
trade. However, it has also been a region of conflicts and divisions, especially during the 
twentieth century, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. 
 The Baltic Sea Region after World War II has been the scene of different security issues, 
power politics and environmental problems. This research is focused on environmental 
cooperation around the Baltic Sea, mainly since 1974 when the Helsinki Convention was signed. 
Environmental cooperation among states in the Baltic Sea Region is an important form of 
cooperation as the Baltic Sea is heavily polluted by shipping, urban waste, chemicals, toxic 
substances, agriculture and industries. But cooperation among states has also been influenced by 
different factors and changing political climate, starting from the Cold War and ending with the 
European Union to where eight states out of nine belong now in the Baltic Sea Region.  
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The first part of the thesis gives theoretical background as regards environmental issues 
and problems in the field of international relations, focusing on two aspects of global 
environmental policy: the Green theory and regime theory. On the one hand, states may have 
green thoughts and environmental-friendly policy, on the other hand, international environmental 
cooperation, especially as regards maritime environment, depends on how efficiently 
international environmental regimes (international organizations and groups of states with 
similar environmental problems) among states work. At the end of the first part, also the 
methodology, hypothesis and research question(s) are introduced. The general research question 
of the Master’s thesis is the following one: what have been the contributory factors of different 
forms of political cooperation to international environmental governance in the Baltic Sea 
region? 
The second part of the Master’s thesis deals with empirical background: political context 
after World War II, environmental governance since 1970s and the role of the European Union in 
the Baltic Sea Region. 
The third part, empirical analysis focuses on two major international bodies as regards 
international environmental cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region: the Helsinki Commission and 
the European Union. This part is divided into three sections: the Helsinki Commission during the 
Cold War, environmental cooperation after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the European 
Union’s policy in the Baltic Sea area after the enlargement of the European Union in 2004 when 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland became full members and the Baltic Sea almost an 
internal sea of the European Union. In the conclusions’ part, the main conclusions of the 
empirical analysis of the Master’s thesis are described. 
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1. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AS PART OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
This section of the paper will focus on the role of ‘environment’ in the theory of international 
relations. The starting point of this section is how much theories of international relations pay 
attention to environmental issues and environmental cooperation among states. The current and 
previous level of knowledge on the topics of international environmental governance and 
international environmental regimes will help us to evaluate and understand the importance of 
environmental problems in international and regional (Baltic Sea) politics. Based on this 
knowledge of theoretical perspectives, it will be possible to analyze international environmental 
governance and the effectiveness of environmental protection in the Baltic Sea region after 
World War II. 
 
 
1.1 Liberal Institutionalism and International Regimes 
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century environmental problems in the world were not as 
significant and serious as at the end of the twentieth century. One of the features of 
environmental problems is that they are international and trans-national: they spread from one 
state to another, from one sea to another, or from one region to another. If an oil tanker sinks in 
the international waters, the pollution caused by the tanker may simultaneously affect coastlines 
and territorial waters of many states around the sea or ocean where the disaster occurred, thus 
affecting also societies, tourism, and economies of many states. Regional or local environmental 
disasters can easily become international environmental problems. Environmental problems 
affect all states around the world. No state is an island unto itself. Therefore, environment is also 
an important aspect of international relations and politics, more today than in the past. 
As regards the theory of international relations, one has to come to terms with the fact 
that thanks to environmental problems the world has entered a new era which is different from 
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the nineteenth-century power politics which emphasized a balance of power. The oldest and most 
commonly adopted theory of international relations is realism: it is a tradition of analysis in 
international relations that emphasizes the way states pursue power politics and protect their own 
national interests.1 According to realist approach states act according to this type of “thinking” 
and do not pay too much attention to what were once considered to be secondary questions like 
environmental issues. However, realism can deal also with environmental issues, but based on 
the assumptions of realist tradition and state-centric worldviews where environment cannot be 
more than a secondary issue. 
Realists argue that in the conditions of international anarchy states are always concerned 
firsthand with their own security and interests, focusing on the ways in which other states may 
threaten their security. Because of this realists have always paid much less attention to global 
environmental change and other types of soft issues in world politics. 
Rather than being optimistic concerning possibilities of international cooperation as are 
liberal-internationalists, realists have instead generated a research agenda in international 
relations theory which focuses on how global environmental change can produce interstate 
conflicts. For realists, environmental problems can only mean that the causes of insecurity have 
changed (or may change) from military affairs to environmental degradation, whereas the 
referent of security remains the same – the nation-state with its interests and security issues. For 
instance, based on the realist approach, environmental problems and environmental change 
(water scarcity, limited renewable resources, etc.) can lead to interstate wars and conflicts in the 
future.2 Thus, realism does not pay attention to the ways how to avoid environmental problems, 
but rather how to come to terms with environmental problems, and how to deal with possible 
conflicts caused by environmental problems (disruption of the balance of power). 
 Liberalism in the field of theory of international relations takes a different approach when 
it comes to explaining and analyzing global and regional environmental problems and 
cooperation among states. As one of the great philosophical frameworks of the European 
Enlightenment era, liberalism traditionally focuses its attention on individual liberty, rights, 
                                                          
1 Jack Donnelly, “Realism,” in Theories of International Relations, ed. Scott Burchill et al. (Houndmills, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 29. 
2 Matthew Paterson, Understanding Global Environmental Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 18-20. 
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political freedom, democratic traditions, equality, market capitalism and globalization.3 
According to Daniel Green, liberal international relations theory was originally ideological, 
normative and prescriptive, focusing on the creation of an international organization, 
international cooperation, increasing interdependence, international law, world peace and 
simultaneous domestic and international democratic political orders.4 
Liberalism is a theory of international relations where relationships between nation-states 
are determined by domestic politics, which ideally should be also democratic. Liberals believe 
that in the international arena various rights and liberties should be protected in the same way as 
they are protected in a democratic state and society.5 One of the rights and liberties that a citizen 
and a state should stand for is people’s right to live in a clean and healthy environment. Global 
environmental problems are an increasingly important issue today and they are leading or have 
already led the world into a new era where environmental problems are common. However, at 
least according to the liberal-institutionalist Peter Willetts, it is also naïve to hope that 
environmental values will always override basic interests, security, wealth, autonomy and status 
of states.6 
Different international relation theories vary in the way they see the role of politics, states 
and institutions in the world when it comes to solving global environmental problems. As 
realism says that global environmental problems are sources of conflicts (paying more attention 
to the conflict itself than environmental problem and solution of environmental crisis), according 
to liberal institutionalism global environmental change leads to increasing cooperation and 
interdependency among nation-states, and thus has led to the emergence of international 
environmental regimes since the 1970s.7 Liberal institutionalism pays more attention to the 
solutions of environmental problems than realism or neorealism do. According to Matthew 
Paterson, social and political problems that transcend state boundaries and become international 
                                                          
3 Scott Burchill, “Liberalism,” in Theories of International Relations, ed. Scott Burchill et al. (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 55. 
4 Daniel Green, “Liberal Imperialism as Global-governance Perspective,” in Contending Perspectives on Global 
Governance: Coherence, Contestation and World Order, ed. Alice D. Ba and Matthew J. Hoffmann (London & New 
York: Routledge, 2005), 235-236. 
5 Burchill, 81 
6 Peter Willetts, “Who Cares About the Environment?” in The Environment and International Relations, ed. John 
Vogler and Mark F. Imber (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 121. 
7 Paterson, 22 
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problems in the realm of sovereign states become in this way a collective problem and must be 
resolved through international cooperation or collaboration. The central devices of international 
cooperation since the 1970s are international regimes which explain largely the mechanism of 
international environmental politics and global economic politics from the aspects of liberal 
institutionalism.8 
The study as well as the term of “international regime” emerged during the 1970s, first in 
the field of economics, offering a theoretical framework for analyzing economic and political 
governance at the international level, especially after the incapability and ineffectuality of the 
United Nations and other organizations or states to deal with increasing international economic 
(and environmental) problems.9 On the other hand, the emergence of international regimes can 
be interpreted also as a response to regional integration in Europe which was inspired by the 
belief that conflicts between states would be reduced or avoided by creating economic and 
political frameworks among members of the same geographic region.10 
 One of the most important theoreticians of regime theory, Oran R. Young, defines 
international regimes in terms of institutional arrangements: sets of roles, rules, decision-making 
procedures, programs and relationships whose members are usually states, but may be also non-
state actors and whose operations and actions center on specific issues and problems associated 
with global civil society. “International environmental regimes” are based on ecological criteria 
and sustainability, trying to manage and contain international environmental problems.11 
Examples of international environmental regimes include the Antarctic Treaty System, different 
regional seas arrangements, the Great Lakes water quality regime in the North America, the 
North Sea management regime and the regime for the protection of the stratospheric ozone 
layer.12 
At the beginning of the process of launching contemporary environmental regimes to deal 
with the transnational and maritime pollution, global warming and sustainable development, the 
                                                          
8 Paterson, 12 
9 Oran R. Young, “Regime Theory and the Quest for Global Governance,” in Contending Perspectives on Global 
Governance: Coherence, Contestation and World Order, ed. Alice D. Ba and Matthew J. Hoffmann (London & New 
York: Routledge, 2005), 88. 
10 Burchill, 64 
11 Oran R. Young, Governance in World Affairs (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1999), 10-13, 120. 
12 Ibid, 115. 
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frameworks of environmental regimes had little political and academic support. However, they 
gained more support during the 1980s and 1990s when liberal institutionalism as a discipline of 
international relations was formed in a response to the new course in the international relations 
theories and to a new mindset in global politics where environmental regimes received more 
support and attention. Liberal institutionalism sorted out international cooperation as a central 
determinant in global environmental governance and sustainable development.13 
Liberal institutionalism emphasizes the role of cooperation among states in maintaining 
regularity and predictability in international politics: the world is stabilized by regimes which 
constrain state behavior and conform expectations of each state to areas of shared interest.14 As 
regards environmental threats and problems caused by human impact on nature, environment and 
climate, one of the shared interests of states is to limit environmental degradation and avoid 
further international environmental problems. 
As a result of the emergence of international regimes, a global community, 
institutionalization, globalization, rising environmental problems and the decline of the dominant 
actors in the world, regime theory arose as a possible solution to the puzzle of global governance 
in the new era. According to regime theory defined by Oran B. Young, states in the international 
system are defined as utility-maximizing actors and they engage in interactive decision-making 
processes, regime formation and international cooperation in which there are mutual benefits 
regarding cooperation (states are interested in the success of the regimes) and incentives for the 
participants. States may also choose non-cooperative strategies if necessary, but only when there 
is no central international authority or government as such.15 
According to Paterson, regimes are not the same as specific agreements, particular 
international organizations or international institutions. Regimes are narrower in their scope and 
can be defined as a subset of international institutions with specific principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures. Regimes are important because they are able to change the 
behavior of states, and influence interstate collaboration, for example, as a result of specific 
global environmental problems (maritime pollution, climate change, carbon dioxide emissions). 
                                                          
13 John Vogler and Mark F. Imber, editors, The Environment and International Relations (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1996), 3-7. 
14 Burchill, 65  
15 Oran R. Young, Governance in World Affairs (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1999), 189-190, 120. 
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However, regimes do not force states, but rather alter incentives facing states and thus play a 
profound role in transforming states’ perceptions of their interests.16 
According to Oran R. Young, regime theory is based on the assumption that international 
cooperation among states is successful only when states are able to form successful international 
regimes – international arrangements or sets of roles, rules and relationships. The main question 
in regime theory is: what are the causes of successes or failures in the processes of forming and 
maintaining international regimes among states in the world. For regime theorists, the formation 
of international regimes can be explained by emphasizing the role of power, interests or 
knowledge. Those theoreticians who explain the formation of international regimes by 
emphasizing power explain the regime as a network where a dominant actor plays the key role 
by choosing to exert its influence to induce others to agree to cooperation. Those who highlight 
the interests of states in the process of the formation of international regimes interpret the 
process of regime formation rather as a bargaining process where regimes form only when states 
get benefits from striking a bargain. Those who emphasize the role of knowledge as a key factor 
in the formation of regimes see discourses and epistemic communities as key elements in 
collective action among states.17 
However, according to Young, international regime formation is not a purpose in itself, 
but is formed to solve a problem. There is the continuous highly structured situation similar to a 
prisoner’s dilemma where states either choose cooperative strategy or not, the problems are 
solved through the strategy or not, the regimes are formed or not, etc.18 Regimes are not always 
successfully formed and maintained, and obviously they do not always solve all the problems in 
the world. However, regimes are formed to enhance trust, order, stability and continuity; they 
develop habits of cooperation, monitoring and sanctioning defectors in the ungoverned and 
decentralized world.19 
In sum, international regimes are based on the interests and incentives of the participants 
(states) rather than power-based frameworks and gains (proposed by international relations 
theories of realism and neo-realism). According to Robyn Eckersley, understanding the broader 
                                                          
16 Paterson, 12-13. 
17 Oran R. Young, Governance in World Affairs (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1999), 191. 
18 Oran R. Young, Governance in World Affairs (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1999), 195. 
19 Burchill, 65 
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constellation of interests associated with international regimes helps us to understand also the 
effectiveness of international regimes.20 However, regime theory alone cannot be the basis of 
analysis of international environmental governance. 
 
 
1.2 Green Theory in International Relations 
 
After World War II, towards the end of the twentieth century, environmental protection emerged 
as an additional and subsidiary task of the Western welfare states. Environmental issues also 
became international political problems which needed solutions, although obviously it was not 
yet a primary task for states.21 However, as time went by, environmental problems became 
everyday political problems rather than marginal ones, as they had been before the Second 
World War. In the beginning, environmental awareness was marked by the first wave of 
environmentalism and international environmental movements of the 1960s and 1970s which 
helped to push the environmental issues from the margins to the mainstream of public policy 
agendas.22 For instance, the term “deep ecology” was coined by Norwegian philosopher Arne 
Naess which opposed earlier, anthropocentric “shallow” ecology. According to the principle of 
“deep ecology”, no one human being or state is given legal or moral dominion over the rest of 
nature.23 Also, the term “social ecology” was coined by Murray Bookchin, which suggested that 
environmental degradation is a product of relationships of domination and exploitation of nature 
by human beings.24 
 As regards the first international environmental problems, the United States of America 
played the vital and crucial role for the prospects of international cooperation, for instance in the 
                                                          
20 Robyn Eckersley, The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004), 28-
29. 
21 Eckersley, 79 
22 Steven Bernstein and Maria Ivanova, “Institutional Fragmentation and Normative Compromise in Global 
Environmental Governance,” in Global Liberalism and Political Order, ed. Steven Bernstein & Louis W. Pauly (New 
York: State University of New York Press, 2007), 164. 
23 Eric Laferriere and Peter J. Stoett, International Relations Theory and Ecological Thought (London: Routledge, 
1999), 60. 
24 Laferriere and Stoett, 63 
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case of Montreal Protocol in 1987, being able to take an effective lead, whereas more recently 
the United States have failed in assuming the leadership of climate change and biodiversity 
policy.25 On the one hand, international environmental problems have become much severe, on 
the other hand there are also other problems in the world (wars, poverty). 
According to Paterson, the problem is that political decisions concerning global climate 
change are deeply imbedded in the broader reproduction of state, political-economic and 
scientific-technological power structures, because of which the neutrality of political decision-
making cannot always be presumed.26 
As a result of the emergence of international environmental regimes and decline of 
dominant powers in the world, international relations theories also have to come to terms with 
the changed situation. According to Peter Willetts, a different research programme and theory 
and a positivist approach for an alternative global international system paradigm is needed.27 
Liberal institutionalism and regime theory promote international regimes in solving the 
environmental problems in the world. However, according to many scholars, global 
environmental regimes have not fulfilled the task of responding adequately to the global 
environmental problems for which they originally were designed.28 The problem with current 
international cooperation in regard to the environment is that international environmental 
regimes are bureaucratic and ineffective. A major overhaul of current international 
environmental regimes should be undertaken in order to overcome the fragmentation of the 
current structure of environmental governance and establish an authoritative international 
environmental body “with a first-rate staff, a reputation for analytical rigor, and the capacity to 
take on tasks such as dispute resolution.”29 
Regarding theories of international relations discussed thus far, while liberal 
institutionalism, neoliberalism, neorealism and even realism more or less address and deal with 
                                                          
25 Robert L. Paarlberg, “Lapsed Leadership: U.S. International Environmental Policy Since Rio,” in The Global 
Environment: Institutions, Law, and Policy, ed. Norman J. Vig & Regina S. Axelrod (Washington, D.C.: A Division of 
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1999), 245. 
26 Paterson, 9 
27 Willetts, 135 
28 Bernstein and Ivanova, 170 
29 Bernstein and Ivanova, 179 
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international environmental problems (international environmental regimes, organizations and 
institutions) and environmental politics, none of them provide a thorough explanation of how and 
why international environmental problems emerge and how they can be solved in international 
politics.  
Green theory, a more recent theory in international relations, is specifically focused on 
environmental protection, the emergence of environmental problems and the human impact on 
environment in the contemporary international political context. According to Paterson, the 
defining characteristics of Green theory as a competing theory in international relations (side by 
side with realism, liberalism and liberal institutionalism) is that it focuses mainly on the role of 
anthropocentric ethics in reducing nature and the environment to their economic value alone for 
human beings and states, and on the questions of limits to growth of human societies.30 
The important question as regards Green political theory in international relations is: why 
is Green theory needed at all? While the previous theories of international relations had been 
sufficient for the system of international relations which dominated before World War II or 
before the end of the Cold War, they cannot be sufficient for analyzing environmental issues as a 
new and increasing subject in politics. Now, as environmental degradation is inevitable in many 
parts of the world, based on the literature of Green political theory, the human impact on 
ecosystems is the main reason of environmental degradation, and the same theories which 
focused on the power politics and international system which have caused environmental 
degradation are not sufficient any more to deal with problems caused by nation-states. Moreover, 
the state-centric framework of realism cannot satisfactorily explain how international law is 
observed by most states most of the time and why basic environmental cooperation between 
states occurs routinely.31 
                                                          
30 Paterson, 35 
31 Eckersley, 28 
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 According to Eckersley, Green international relations theory is by nature critical, 
problem-oriented, interdisciplinary, and normative, promoting environmental justice and 
sustainable patterns of development.32 
 Paterson refers to three major authors in the contemporary literature of Green political 
theory in international relations: Robyn Eckersley, Robert Goodin, and Andrew Dobson. 
According to Eckersley, the defining characteristic of Green political theory in international 
relations is Ecocentrism which is a view that opposes to anthropocentrism (which leads to 
environmental degradation rather than environmental protection) and says that world is 
composed of interrelationships, that all entities are embedded in ecological relationships, and that 
there is no rigid distinction between human beings (or states in international relations) and the 
rest of the nature.33 
 According to Robyn Eckersley, one has to revalue the role, function and power of states 
in environmental issues and environmental politics. Although the political autonomy of states is 
widely believed to be in decline, states possess a monopoly of control over the means of 
coercion; accordingly, the coercive arm of states can be used to protect the environment.34 At the 
same time, states should pay less attention to pursuit of national security as military training, 
weapons production and armed conflicts can also be major causes of ecological degradation in 
the world.35 
 The views of Robert Goodin in the Green political theory are based on ethics and values 
(‘Green theory of value’) which are defining characteristics and at the center of the Green 
political theory. According to Paterson, Goodin’s formulation of Green political theory is highly 
problematic because he, unlike Eckersley who has a holistic view of ecocentrism, emphasizes a 
distinction between natural (non-human) nature and artificial (human) environment and does not 
argue so much why the environment is being destroyed by humans. Andrew Dobson’s view of 
Green political theory is based on the ‘limits of growth’ argument; based on that argument the 
exponential economic growth and industrialization are the root causes of environmental 
                                                          
32 Robyn Eckersley, “Green Theory,” in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 255, http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199298334/dunne_chap13.pdf/ (Accessed 29 
March 2012)  
33 Paterson, 36-37 
34 Robyn Eckersley, The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004), 7. 
35 Ibid, 25 
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degradation and crisis in the world. Economic growth has produced a situation where the world 
is running out of natural resources and the environment does not have absorptive capacity to 
assimilate the waste and pollution caused by industrialization and economic growth. Based on 
this Green political theory, the economic and population growth of human societies is the reason 
for environmental crises in the world and therefore, human societies may experience collapse in 
the future.36 
 Green political theory tries to analyze and critically assess world politics and the 
international relations theories which have been dominant before the current environmental 
crisis. International politics which have led to environmental crisis cannot be supported or 
maintained if the goal of international system is to save or protect the environment. Paterson’s 
argument is that global environmental governance and environmental problems should be 
interpreted as phenomena inside the logics of interrelated power structures of the state system, 
capitalism, scientific knowledge and patriarchy. According to Paterson, these four basic power 
structures have caused the environmental degradation and in order to solve or come to terms with 
environmental problems, one should evaluate and critically estimate these power structures.37 
 According to Paterson, scientific knowledge should be regarded as an underlying 
structural cause of environmental problems for two reasons. First, Paterson argues that modern 
science was founded on the assumption that humans are separated from the rest of natural world 
and thus dominate over the environment, which accordingly has led to anti-ecological attitudes 
and practices as nature is regarded as an object for human instrumental use.38 The second 
argument of Paterson is that scientific knowledge, as knowledge of particular scientific elites, 
has taken away control over the environment from individuals and communities who would be 
more interested in sustainable management of environments than modern states and modern 
scientific elites.39 
 Green political theory criticizes also the basic components and units of international 
systems which are focus of previous, traditional international relations theories. On the one hand, 
Green political theory is against the state-centric worldview. According to Paterson, state-
                                                          
36 Paterson, 36-38 
37 Paterson, 40 
38 Paterson, 50 
39 Paterson, 51 
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building, state systems and state elites have systematically promoted accumulation, in this way 
producing environmental change as a product of their internal operation.40 On the other hand, 
Green theory emphasizes the role of nation-states, since states, once they act collectively, have 
the capacity to limit ecological problems (global warming, nuclear waste) and the 
environmentally harmful consequences of capitalism.41  
 However, international relations theories like realism and neoliberalism, or liberal 
institutionalism, do not pay attention to environmental issues as the most important component 
of international relations and world politics. For example, liberal institutionalism focuses on how 
international regimes are maintained, formed and how they coordinate the behavior of states in 
mutually beneficial ways.42 Therefore Green political theory focuses on environmental issues as 
major international problems caused by state political systems and claims industrialism – the 
cause of environmental degradation – to be overriding feature common to both capitalism and 
communism.43 
 Green theory is becoming more important in the field of international relations, as the 
theory is based on the problems states are facing today, not only explaining the historical 
developments of the previous state system (balance of power, formation of international regimes 
or interdependence). According to theoreticians Eric Laferriere and Peter J. Stoett, the era of 
environmental problems and globalization means that it is an appropriate time to also add 
ecological thought and Green political theory to the wide scope of international relations 
scholarship in order to understand the relationship between the contemporary political order and 
ecological crisis.44 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
40 Paterson, 43-45 
41 Eckersley, 7-8 
42 Paterson, 13 
43 Andrew Dobson, Green Political Thought (London: Routledge, 2000), 29. 
44 Laferriere and Stoett, 165 
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1.3 Methodology 
 
Green political theory and regime theory are going to be the basis for my analyses of 
international environmental governance in the Baltic Sea region after World War II. Both 
theories have a common issue they are dealing with: environment. Green theory looks at 
international politics and political cooperation from the aspects of environmental problems and 
Green ideas. Regime theory, on the other hand, tries to look at international political cooperation 
from the aspects of how international environmental regimes and forms of international 
environmental cooperation (institutions, arrangements, and agreements) among states work. 
Therefore together, these two theories form a framework which helps to evaluate the 
effectiveness of international environmental governance in the Baltic Sea region. How much 
international cooperation has there been based on Green views? How effective are international 
environmental regime(s)? These questions are also the starting point for empirical analysis in this 
research. Also, how realistic are prospects for solving transnational environmental problems in 
the current world asks Oran B. Young in the book “Governance in World Affairs”.45 The same 
question can be asked about the Baltic Sea in the context of European Union and international 
cooperation: the states are dealing with their own national interests, and what motivates them to 
solve international environmental problems. 
According to Young, the effectiveness of international environmental regimes is based on 
an evaluation of how regimes solve environmental problems, or to what extent regimes are able 
to avoid further degradation of the environment without solving the problem.46 According to 
Young, international regimes arise to solve environmental problems. However, it is hard to say 
whether an environmental regime has failed or not only based on whether a problem is 
absolutely solved, but it is possible to find out which factors lead to the further degradation of 
environment and which factors help an environmental regime become more effective in the 
future. According to Young, an environmental problem can grow even more severe in the 
absence of an international environmental regime.47 Accordingly, the Baltic Sea could be in 
much worse condition in the absence of the European Union which may be important to maintain 
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environmental regimes. Young emphasizes that the core of regime theory is that states have their 
motives and mutual benefits derived from international regimes.48 The European Union and its 
regulations can be a reason to take part in environmental cooperation. 
In sum, based on regime theory there are regimes and institutions which matter in the 
politics of contemporary world. In the Baltic Sea region, one cannot ignore the importance of the 
European Union, the Helsinki Commission, international organizations, and other forms of 
cooperation among states. During the Cold War and immediately thereafter, cooperation among 
states in the Baltic Sea region was less effective than it is now, after the enlargement of the 
European Union in 1995 and 2004. However, during the past four decades the development of 
international environmental regimes in the Baltic Sea region has been influenced by different 
factors: foreign policies, economy, security, civil society, and democratization. International 
environmental protection of the Baltic Sea has been influenced by environmental regimes. 
How can an environmental regime be more effective based on Green theory? Green 
theory emphasizes the role of nature and environment in international relations and human 
societies. On the other hand, green theory emphasizes also networks in the political space, 
focusing rather on cooperation than the nation-state-centric worldview.49 
How does political cooperation help to protect the environment? What are the political 
causes of the environmental degradation of the Baltic Sea? Taking into account the green 
political theoreticians’ arguments how environmental and ecological problems can be solved in 
the broader international level, it is also more understandable why and how the environmental 
governance in the Baltic Sea region is in the condition where it is now (what are the reasons of 
eutrophication, high level of hazardous substances and problems with wastewater treatment), and 
how this environmental cooperation can be increased and made more effective in the future. Or, 
why the environmental institutional governance cannot be effective at all in the region based on 
the current environmental regimes and low or insufficient level of political cooperation. 
The research question of the thesis is: what are the contributory factors of different forms 
of political cooperation to international environmental governance in the Baltic Sea region? The 
                                                          
48 Ibid, 190 
49 Paterson, 39 
20 
 
periods of time on which the research will focus are: 1) the period before the collapse of the 
Soviet Union (after World War II until 1991) and the period after the fall of the Iron Curtain and 
collapse of the Soviet Union. These periods are comparable in terms of Europeanization, 
democratization, economic growth and the enlargement of the European Union. The process of 
joining the European Union started in the Baltic Sea region after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. 
The expanded research questions are: what are more specifically these different forms 
and institutions of political cooperation which are contributing factors to the international 
environmental governance of the Baltic Sea region, and how did these forms of political 
cooperation and institutions come into existence after World War II? For example, international 
and intergovernmental organizations which deal with the environmental protection of the Baltic 
Sea have always been influenced by political climate in the Baltic Sea region. For example, one 
could assume that the Helsinki Commission was influenced by the existence of the Soviet Union 
(or Iron Curtain, and East-West division) and is influenced by the European Union (the 
enlargement of the EU, the EU strategies, research funding, etc.). The effects of the European 
Union on the environmental governance and cooperation in the Baltic Sea region is an important 
issue especially if we take into account the period before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
period after the enlargement of the European Union. For example, while the European Union is 
important for international environmental cooperation, the environmental degradation of the 
Baltic Sea obviously did not also stop after the collapse of the Soviet Union and after the 
enlargement of the European Union. However, the importance of the Helsinki Commission as an 
intergovernmental organization, side by side with the environmental awareness, has increased 
after the enlargement of the European Union in the Baltic Sea region.  
But international environmental governance is influenced also by other factors, such as 
economic cooperation, the EU-Russia relations, bilateral and multilateral agreements (Nord 
Stream gas pipeline). For instance, cooperation between the European Union and Russia can 
significantly influence international environmental governance in the Baltic Sea region. Russia, 
in the context of the European Union-Russia relations after the enlargement of the European 
Union, is not dealing with the nation-states in the Baltic Sea region (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, etc.), but with the European Union as a much larger and more powerful political entity. 
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On the other hand, the European Union has become one of the most important factors and actors 
in the protection of the Baltic Sea also in regards to the relationships between states inside the 
European Union: states which are part of the European Union have to play by the rules of the 
European Union. 
The variables of the current research are international environmental cooperation and the 
factors which have influenced the international environmental cooperation in the Baltic Sea 
region. The dependent variable is international environmental cooperation in the Baltic Sea 
region. The independent variables are factors which influence or have influenced international 
environmental governance, including different forms and institutions of political cooperation, for 
example – the European Union, cooperation between the European Union and Russia, the 
Helsinki Commission and other international organizations, civil society, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), scientific community, agreements between nation-states, etc. 
The hypothesis of the thesis is that the protection of the international environment and 
international environmental cooperation depends on the effectiveness of the framework of 
international political cooperation. For example, this framework can be based the European 
Union. In this case, it is necessary to analyze the European strategies towards the Baltic Sea (the 
European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, the European Union’s Baltic Sea Region 
programme 2007-2013, etc.). On the other hand, the framework can be based on the 
intergovernmental organizations which aim at protecting the environment of the Baltic Sea (the 
Helsinki Commission). In that case, the thesis will analyze the documents of Helsinki 
Commissions (the Helsinki Convention, HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan). Also, based on 
literature and documents which evaluate the role of the Helsinki Commission before and after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, a critical assessment of the work of the Helsinki Commission is 
needed. Obviously, international environmental governance in the Baltic Sea region has not been 
a success story. 
In sum, international environmental cooperation does not depend only on attitude of 
nation-states towards the environment, although this may be one of the reasons why some states 
have more Green politics than the others. But in spite of the fact that one could be optimistic and 
hope that there are in a democratic world-order and according to liberal institutionalism more 
states which have more environmental-friendly domestic and foreign policy than others, the 
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protection of the Baltic Sea as a transnational water basin is much more complicated issue. States 
have also other interests than the environment as do have people in their societies. However, 
according to Paterson, other goals of states have been disrupted by global environmental 
problems.50 This can be one of the reasons why states in the contemporary world are more 
willing to cooperate than confront each other as it happened during the Cold War. While there 
may be a general reason why states around the Baltic Sea protect the environment (at the end of 
the day, everybody wants to live in a clean environment), the current thesis will focus on more 
specific factors which influence states in the Baltic Sea region to cooperate in order to protect the 
environment of the Baltic Sea. 
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2. EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND 
 
At the beginning of the Cold War, international environmental cooperation in the Baltic Sea 
Region was out of the question: post-war states around the Baltic Sea were not able to cooperate 
in the field of environmental issues – although there were already signs of environmental 
degradation of the Baltic Sea. However, during the 1960s international cooperation on 
environmental issues became used to foster trust between countries that belonged to opposing 
military alliances in the Baltic Sea region.51 Later on, the Helsinki Commission (since 1970s) 
and the European Union (after enlargements in 1995 and 2004) have been the main engines of 
international environmental cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region. 
This chapter focuses on the background of the international environmental and political 
cooperation in the Baltic Sea region since World War II. 
The chapter is divided into three parts: the first part is dealing with political context of the 
Baltic Sea region after World War II which gives an overview of the early developments of the 
political and environmental cooperation in the Northern Europe. 
The second part of this section is dealing with international environmental cooperation in 
the Baltic Sea region. The Helsinki Convention was the first important form of international 
environmental cooperation during the Cold War. 
The third part of this section is dealing with the European Union and The EU Strategy for 
the Baltic Sea Region. The European Union is playing a vital part also in the work of the 
Helsinki Commission after the EU enlargements as eight out of nine contracting parties of the 
Helsinki Commission belong now to the European Union. 
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2.1 The Baltic Sea Region after World War II: Political Context 
 
According to a book written by Dr. Alfred Bilmanis and published in 1945 in Washington D.C., 
with the title “Baltic Essays”, the Baltic Sea has a certain analogy with the Mediterranean Sea as 
it separates and unites simultaneously nine riparian countries – Denmark, Sweden, Finland, 
Germany, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.52 While describing the Baltic Sea, 
Bilmanis mentions that because of its geographical position, the Baltic Sea lies in the Northern 
Europe: “The distance between Kiel and Haparanda, the Swedish port at the most north-eastern 
point of the Baltic sea, is roughly 1000 miles, whereas the latitudinal distance across the Baltic 
Sea, from east to west, is about 275 miles. To the north lies the Gulf of Bothnia, and to the north-
east the Gulf of Finland. To the east extends the large shallow Gulf of Riga, so called after 
Latvia’s capital.”53 
However, in 1945 the further situation and destiny of the Baltic Sea was determined 
rather by political East-West division than by geographical peculiarities or the historical identity 
of the Baltic Sea as a sea in the North. Bilmanis continues: “The Baltic peoples, who during the 
middle ages and the Renaissance were the prospective victims of the policy of larger states, came 
of age at last and assumed their own life as independent nations. The newly established Baltic 
States became economically self-supporting, the Baltic Sea free, and the Baltic ports were more 
efficiently operated than ever before. This situation could have been made lasting. But instead of 
agreeing to maintain the neutral bridge between them, Germany and Russia, in 1939, returned to 
power politics.”54 
The Baltic Sea became a divided sea during and after World War II. As the collapse and 
division of Germany led to a new political situation in Europe, almost the entire postwar Baltic 
Sea region fell under the dominance of Russian power which had for centuries struggled to gain 
a presence in the Baltic Sea region.55 Increased Soviet military presence in the Baltic Sea became 
unavoidable. The Danish island of Bornholm was liberated by Russian troops, Soviet rule was 
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established in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the Soviet Union dominated the Allied Control 
Commission in Finland where the Soviet Union maintained also a military base until 1955, and 
the Soviet Union wrangled with the Swedish government over the delineation of territorial 
waters.56 
One cannot ignore or undervalue the importance of the Soviet impact on the Baltic Sea 
region after World War II. After World War II, the Soviet bloc stretched from the Baltic to the 
Adriatic Sea and for almost a half a century the states under Soviet hegemony were removed 
from full membership in the European community where they had belonged before World War 
II. A ‘new Eastern Europe’ was formed in the Baltic Sea region, regardless the previous 
historical evolution of the states on the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea. The continuous process of 
Soviet remodeling of the political, social and economic structures took place on the eastern 
shore.57 
One of the crucial results as regards the division of the Baltic Sea after World War II was 
that the two western neutral countries, Finland and Sweden, became the leaders in 
intergovernmental negotiations on political cooperation in the Baltic Sea area without provoking 
political conflicts between the Great Powers. In late 1960s, Sweden took the first initiative by 
advocating an agreement to protect the Baltic Sea from oil discharges from ships which, 
however, resulted in no international agreement.58 
The underlying problem in the Baltic Sea region was the division of Germany as NATO 
countries refused to sign intergovernmental agreements in which the German Democratic 
Republic was a contracting party.59 
The role of Finland in promoting international cooperation, stabilization and 
peacemaking among the states of the Baltic Sea became crucial during the Cold War. The 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), proposed by the Soviet Union, was 
regarded as the most important Finnish foreign policy achievement at the time.60 
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 The years after World War II were the years of economic growth, economic 
transformation, rise of industrial output, and foundation of modern welfare states in Finland, 
Sweden and Denmark. For example, in Finland World War II was decisive in reshaping society’s 
attitude towards welfare provision – the state-sponsored welfare system was established.61 
 Different was the post-war experience in the newly formed socialist states of the Baltic 
Sea region. In the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and Poland, post-war economics 
and politics were characterized by forced deportations, collectivization (collective farms and 
state farms) and the procurement policies of the Stalinist regime.62 According to David Kirby, 
collectivization was a social and economic disaster where pragmatic economic considerations 
mattered less than the political imperatives of the Soviet Union.63 
According to Clive Archer, during the Cold War period, the whole Baltic Sea region was 
enmeshed in the realist and heavily state-oriented understanding of security: the overriding 
security concern was the interests of the Soviet Union.64 
The collapse of the Soviet Union finally brought change to the Baltic Sea region. 
According to Archer, in the 1990s, the Baltic Sea region states recognized that their security 
situation had changed as the fear of bipolar conflict in Europe had almost disappeared and new 
threats and problems were on the way: ethnic issues, migration, criminality (international crime), 
threats to the environment (increasing threat as the new capitalist countries in Eastern Europe 
were experiencing economic growth), the spread of disease (open borders).65 In addition, the 
impact of the Cold War did not disappear immediately: the armed forces, weaponry, military 
basis, etc. 
However, after the Cold War the Baltic Sea region developed a highly dynamic 
transnational cooperation and new networks emerged in the area, for example the Union of 
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Baltic Cities, regional multi-stakeholder approaches like Baltic 21, etc. The Baltic Sea region 
appeared to be a fertile ground for transnational networks and international cooperation.66 
During the 1990s, environmental issues were often sidelined by more immediate 
economic and geopolitical concerns on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea (Poland, Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania).67 Obviously entry into the Euro-Atlantic community was a natural 
progression for the states on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea.68 The Baltic States and Poland 
chose to pursue the foreign policy goal of full and speedy integration into the European Union 
and NATO and in 2004 this goal was achieved.69 At the same time, all the Baltic States and 
Poland had also the goal to seek a withdrawal from Russia’s sphere of influence.70 
After the end of the Cold War, increasing cooperation among the states in the Baltic Sea 
Region occurred on many levels: in September 1991, the Union of the Baltic Cities was founded 
in Gdansk, Poland by 32 cities from ten countries around the Baltic Sea: this network was 
formed as a tool for the activities and interests of its members. Transnational urban policy 
focused on different issues, including environment, health and social affairs, education, society, 
tourism, transportation, business, culture, sports, and urban planning.71 
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2.2 Environmental Governance in the Baltic Sea Region after World War II 
 
The environmental protection of the Baltic Sea became an important political issue for the Baltic 
Sea Region after World War II. As a result of pollution, increased marine traffic and general 
environmental awareness, scientists started to evaluate the Baltic Sea already by the 1970s as one 
of the most polluted seas in the world.72  
 According to Juha Beurling, the health of the marine environment of the Baltic Sea has 
been seriously damaged already since the 1960s as a result of untreated human waste, various 
toxic substances and materials, metal (especially lead), urban pollution, industrial water, 
agricultural run-off (fertilizers) and wastewater from pulp-and-paper industries.73 
The degradation of the environmental status of the Baltic Sea during the late 20th century 
had many causes: “The most popular hypothesis starts from the assumption that economic 
performance causes environmental problems and increasing economic performance boosts 
environmental degradation (prosperity pollution).”74 
As a result, environmental issues were placed on governmental domestic political 
agendas in Sweden, Finland and Denmark during the 1960s and 1970s. As there was no 
international framework or agreement, the main solutions were national point-source pollution 
abatement. However, as a result of the cross-border character of pollution in the Baltic Sea, also 
some treaty mechanisms and (international and local) control institutions were also created in the 
framework of United Nations already before the 1980s.75 Also, in 1968 Finland and the Soviet 
Union agreed on bilateral scientific and technological cooperation relating to the Gulf of Finland, 
and a few years later Sweden and the Soviet Union engaged in similar bilateral research 
cooperation.76 
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Increased regional and international environmental cooperation among states in the Baltic 
Sea area led finally to the formation of Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission, also 
called the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM). The Helsinki Commission, as one of the most 
important regional environmental organizations now in the Baltic Sea region, is the governing 
body of the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, 
which was signed in Helsinki on the 22nd of March 1974.77 
The Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, 
widely known as the Helsinki Convention, is a legally binding international treaty.78 At the time 
it was signed, it was a pathfinder in the international environmental policy, in the protection of 
the marine environments and in Baltic Sea politics generally in many ways. The Helsinki 
Convention as a treaty which covered almost all the area of a sea and all the pollutants of the sea 
known at the time it was drafted, signed and ratified, was the first of its kind as an international 
environmental convention, and was used later as a model by other international environmental 
conventions.79 
The first and the most important reason why the Helsinki Convention was signed was 
environmental pollution of the Baltic Sea, but this was not the only reason states around the 
Baltic Sea decided to cooperate: the Helsinki Convention had also a political dimension and 
reason which determined the framework and the contents of the convention.80 
In a way the originally signed convention failed to fulfill its purpose. The Helsinki 
Convention was revised, updated and broadened in 1992, including now also coastal zone 
management, inland waters of the Baltic Sea states and biodiversity. Thus it also became 
applicable to the new political situation in the Baltic Sea Region after the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
signed by all nine independent states around the Baltic Sea and by the European Community.81 
On the other hand, as already mentioned the Helsinki Convention has always had a political 
dimension, and it had an extraordinary meaning in the context of the Cold War. In 1974 when 
the states of the Baltic Sea region signed the Helsinki Convention, the Baltic Sea was divided 
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both politically and culturally by the Iron Curtain and the main task of the convention was to 
harmonize the scientific and technological practices of the seven signatory countries which 
included then Denmark, Sweden, Finland, the Soviet Union, Poland, the German Democratic 
Republic, and the Federal Republic of Germany.82 Therefore one could say that it was a 
remarkable achievement: it was the first multilateral convention which was signed by the 
members of two mutually competing military alliances – Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization – in addition to the politically neutral states Sweden and Finland.83 This led to 
increased political cooperation in the Baltic Sea region during the Cold War. 
The Helsinki Commission as an intergovenmental organization started to operate by 1980 
– after the coastal states of the Baltic Sea of the Cold War era had ratified the Helsinki 
Convention and the convention officially entered into force.84 
The aim and responsibility of Helsinki Commission was to be the main environmental 
policy-maker for the Baltic Sea region by ensuring navigation safety, hastening national and 
trans-national response to accidents at sea, protecting biodiversity of the marine environment of 
the Baltic Sea and developing specific measures to protect the Baltic Sea from land-based and 
sea-based pollution.85 The Helsinki Commission in its style and purpose has worked as a 
technical-scientific organization responsible for monitoring and compilation of the data on the 
Baltic Sea marine environment and making certain decisions or recommendations to end the use 
of certain pollutants.86 The organization is working mainly through intergovernmental 
cooperation between the coastal states of the Baltic Sea. The coordination of intergovernmental 
environmental activities is supported by a secretariat in Helsinki where the commission meets 
annually and holds occasional ministerial meetings.87 
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The Helsinki Commission is assisted and supported also by separate committees, and 
expert and working groups which are dealing with specific issues of the Baltic Sea marine 
environment, like monitoring and nature conservation.88 
During its activity for more than three decades the Helsinki Commission has produced 
several environmental and operational response networks in the Baltic Sea area which give the 
people around the Baltic Sea some hope that the deterioration of one of the most polluted sea 
areas in the world can be stopped.89 However, to stop the pollution entirely is impossible. 
One of the most important duties of the Helsinki Commission has been to make 
decisions, resolutions or recommendations which, however, have an advisory nature and are not 
legally binding: these recommendations must only be taken into account in national legislations 
and environmental programmes of participants (states) and thus place emphasis on the political 
will, national capacities and financial resources of the states concerned.90 Decisions are taken by 
the Helsinki Commission unanimously, and most of them take the form of recommendations to 
the governments of the contracting parties.91 
The achievements of the Helsinki Commission include approximately 110 
recommendations since the beginning of 1980s, the reduction of industrial emissions and 
hazardous substances, new legislation for the prevention of pollution by marine traffic and the 
improvement of regional environmental monitoring and assessment.92 
The nature of the Helsinki Commission has changed gradually, extending its role, 
authority and activities quite significantly. In the beginning, the Helsinki Commission was 
restricted by the national security doctrine of the Soviet Union, but after the end of the Cold War 
the authority of the Helsinki Commission extended also to the coastal zone of the Baltic Sea.93 In 
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addition, the Helsinki Commission has enhanced cooperation with the non-governmental sector, 
civil society actors and other stakeholders.94 
However, the environmental degradation of the Baltic Sea has not yet stopped. The 
countries around the Baltic Sea have become economically more prosperous than they had been 
before: 
“One explanation for increasing levels of fertilizer consumption in the Eastern riparian 
countries may be found in growing competition within the agricultural sectors of these countries 
resulting from European Union (EU) membership. However, with the exception of Poland, it 
needs to be stressed that the level of fertilizer consumption on arable land in Eastern riparian 
countries is substantially lower than that in Western countries (around 3000 kilograms per square 
kilometre (kg/km2) of arable land in 2000 in Estonia and Latvia, and 5000 kg/km2 in Lithuania 
compared to 10,000 to 22,000 kg/km2 at the same point in time in Western riparian countries).”95 
However, the Helsinki Commission is not the only institution dealing with environmental 
protection of the Baltic Sea. In 1952 the Nordic Council was established for cooperation among 
Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland (joined the council in 1955). In the framework 
of the Nordic Council, several programs of environmental cooperation were prepared and 
established, including the Nordic Program for the Environment (1989), joint action plans 
coverning air and sea pollution issues and promoting cleaner waste and recycling technology in 
the Baltic Sea region.96 
Because of the lack of instruments to force states around the Baltic Sea to act in 
accordance with the letter of the Helsinki Convention, environmental policy in the Baltic Sea 
Region remained inefficient and deficient until the end of the Cold War and even at the 
beginning of the 1990s, before the enlargement of the European Union.97 States around the 
Baltic Sea actually did not fulfil the recommendations of the Helsinki Commission, and there 
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were huge differencies between states as regards adding the recommendations to their domestic 
legislations and creating effective means to combat marine pollution.98 
 
 
2.3 The European Union and the Baltic Sea 
 
Western Europe states (later European Union) have played a vital role in environmental and 
political cooperation of the Baltic Sea Region during and after the Cold War. Four important 
western organizations have played an important role in representing the process of western 
integration in the Baltic Sea Region: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), the Council of Europe, the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO).99 
During the 1980s and 1990s, in Western Europe environmental awareness and concern 
were growing and gained an important place on the political agenda.100 Earlier, traditional 
environmental policies and environmental cooperation in Western and Northern Europe had 
rather had a local conservation approach (commissions and associations for nature conservation 
and preservation in Denmark).101 During the Cold War nation states were the major actors in the 
field of environmental policy and environmental protection, but as a result of the EU 
enlargement, the European Union became the main central principal actor in the field of 
environmental policy in transnational and regional level of the Baltic Sea region.102 
 After the enlargement of the European Union, the EU started to play an important role in 
security and environmental issues of the Baltic Sea area as the Baltic Sea became almost an 
inland sea of the European Union, and the problems of the Baltic Sea affected directly also the 
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European Union. Eight out of nine Baltic Sea states are now full members of the European 
Union. However, for the new Eastern European member states, environmental issues have often 
been rather sidelined by more immediate economic, security and geopolitical concerns: 
environmental concerns over the protection of the Baltic Sea marine environment surface on the 
foreign policy agendas only when aligned with direct geopolitical issues (Nord Stream pipeline 
project between Germany and Russia).103 Therefore, one can still see the differences between the 
environmental attitudes of Western Europe and new member states of the European Union on the 
eastern coast of the Baltic Sea. 
 Good examples of the EU policy towards the Baltic Sea are “the European Union’s Baltic 
Sea Region Programme 2007-2013” and “the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea 
Region” (2009). These political programs concern the eight member states bordering the Baltic 
Sea, and focus on topics like economy, environment, sustainable management, regional policies 
etc. More and more important is also cooperation between the European Union and Russia which 
is not the member state, but belongs to the Baltic Sea region and is engaged in economic and 
political activities of the Northern European and Baltic Sea space.104 
One of the most significant programs regarding the European Union and the Baltic Sea 
Region is The European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region which was launched in 2009 
and which quickly became the major way in which the European Union relates to the Baltic Sea 
region. The European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region is a macro-regional strategy 
which alters relations with and among other institutional actors in the Baltic Sea Region (the 
Helsinki Commission, Council of the Baltic Sea States, The Baltic Sea Parliamentary 
Conference, and the Baltic Sea States Sub-regional Co-operation).105 
The EU strategy is built around four pillars or priority areas: 1) environmental 
sustainability, 2) prosperity of the region, 3) accessibility and attractiveness, and 4) safety and 
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security.106 The strategy has coordinating nature: it does not carry projects on its own, but rather 
aims at coordinating international environmental governance around the Baltic Sea.107 
The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region is facing also many problems and challenges, 
as regards funding, political will, international attention, and the wider role and impact of the 
strategy.108 It is not yet possible to say whether the strategy has been a successful tool in the 
environmental governance of the Baltic Sea. 
The EU strategy for the Baltic Sea Region deals also with problematic interaction with 
the non-EU partner of the Baltic Sea – Russia, and with the cooperation between the European 
Union and Russia in the Baltic Sea Region.109 In a way, the Baltic Sea is a meeting place of the 
EU-Russia relations. First of all, Russia is obviously an important actor in the Baltic Sea regional 
energy structure, being a major supplier of energy resources for the European countries and the 
Baltic Sea region countries bordering Russia, the Nord-Stream gas pipeline being one of the 
most significant examples of Russia’s newly established and increased interactions with the 
European Union.110 In addition to natural gas, also electricity supplies and power generation 
facilities have become important issues in the regional energy dynamics of the Baltic Sea 
region.111 Russia has shown its willingness to retain its presence in the electricity markets of the 
Baltic Sea region – however, the prospective power plant in the Kaliningrad region of Russia 
may raise questions regarding environmental threats.112 
 In sum, in this chapter I have focused on environmental and political cooperation in the 
Baltic Sea region after World War II: first, focusing on political context of the post-war years, 
then on the Cold War and the role of the Helsinki Commission, and finally on the impact of the 
European Union and the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region.  Marine environmental 
protection in the Baltic Sea region has been the problematic issue which has been influenced by 
many factors, including political situation of the Cold War period and post-Cold War era (the 
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1990s), the enlargement of the European Union, economic activities (shipping), marine pollution 
(oil pollution, industrial waste, agriculture, urban waste management), local policies, energy 
policies, and by the willingness of the Baltic Sea states to decrease human impact on the sea. 
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3. EMIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
The empirical analysis is focusing on the work and co-production of two international bodies – 
the Helsinki Commission and the European Union – for two main reasons. First, pollution and 
environmental degradation of the Baltic Sea is a trans-boundary and international (political) 
problem, not a local one affecting a single state or problem of the domestic policy. Although 
heightened national concern can have impact on governments to take stronger action on the 
environment,113 effective environmental protection of the Baltic Sea depends on the international 
cooperation. The environmental situation of the Baltic Sea can be improved only through 
international cooperation. Environmental policy of every state of the Baltic Sea Region has also 
impact on the Baltic Sea, but the Baltic Sea is most of all a common water basin. Therefore, it is 
important to focus on international, intergovernmental organizations and trans-boundary 
cooperation between the nation-states. 
  For second, there is no doubt that these two international organizations – the Helsinki 
Commission and the European Union – have already had more impact on the international 
environmental governance of the Baltic Sea Region than any other organization or form of 
political cooperation. However, they both have contributed to international environmental 
cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region to a certain degree, according to the political situation and 
changing political environment. For instance, the Cold War period and the 1990s put limits on 
international cooperation, whereas the enlargement of the European Union contributed to the 
environmental cooperation. Although the intergovernmental regimes are often regarded as 
endless and ineffectual wordsmiths,114 the impacts of these two organizations on the 
environmental protection of the Baltic Sea have not been based only on the words, but also on 
the deeds and real actions, like monitoring, improved navigation safety and waste-water 
treatment. 
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3.1 The Helsinki Convention 
 
In order to analyze or evaluate the work, effectiveness, meanings and role of the Helsinki 
Commission, one must start from the very beginning: the draft of the Helsinki Convention in 
1974. The starting point is the formation of an international environmental regime during the 
1970s in the Baltic Sea Region among the contracting parties of the Helsinki Convention. 
The current part of the analysis will try to answer to the following two questions: how the 
Helsinki Commission was influenced by the contradictory political situation of the Cold War, 
meaning both the division of the Baltic Sea Region (East versus West) and the rise of 
environmental awareness in the international arena during the 1970s (conventions, regimes and 
international law)? As a matter of fact, the primary reason for the foundation of the Helsinki 
Commission was environmental degradation of the Baltic Sea, but to a certain extent the 
formation of the environmental regime was also a political process and political initiative of 
certain states. 
The second question is: how much the Helsinki Commission has influenced and 
increased international environmental protection in the Baltic Sea region: in other words, how to 
estimate the effectiveness of this international organization as an environmental regime? 
There are many ways how to measure effectiveness of a regime. One meaning of 
effectiveness with regard to international environmental regimes is based on the extent to which 
regimes solve the problems that lead to their formation.115 The other meaning of effectiveness is 
based on the behavioral consequences of the members of regime: whether regimes or 
international environmental governance play a role in shaping or guiding the behavior of 
member states of international regimes.116 Based on these two criteria of effectiveness also the 
following analysis is conducted. 
According to the former Executive Secretary of the Helsinki Commission, Anne 
Christine Brusendorff, the Helsinki Commission has been the main environmental policy-maker 
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for the Baltic Sea Region by developing specific measures to protect and conserve the unique 
marine environment of the Baltic Sea.117 Brusendorff maintains that these environmental gains 
of the Helsinki Commission validate the belief that the deterioration of one of the most polluted 
seas in the world can be stopped and the state of the marine environment of the Baltic Sea 
improved.118 This is one way how to evaluate the effectiveness of the environmental regime. 
However, the efforts of this organization have not been entirely successful – the condition 
of the Baltic Sea has been deteriorating also during the time the Helsinki Commission has been 
existent. The degradation of the environmental status of the Baltic Sea occurred also during the 
1970s, 1980s and 1990s for many reasons, economic growth and increased prosperity of the 
coastal states and societies being the main ones.119 For example, pollutants of the Baltic Sea are 
caused also by car traffic which has increased substantially in most Eastern European riparian 
countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union.120 One could ask, was the Helsinki Commission 
able to reduce human impact on the Baltic Sea, or were the efforts of the Helsinki Commission 
rather of marginal importance as regards solving the environmental problem named degradation 
of the Baltic Sea? 
According to Tuomas Räsänen and Simo Laakkonen, pollution of the seas is an excellent 
example of so-called “tragedy of the commons” – the concept first used by Garrett Hardin in 
1968 – as no single state around a sea or on the shore of an ocean or sea claims ownership of the 
seas, and once the serious degradation of the marine environment occurs, states lack capacity, 
strength, financial and scientific ability and knowledge to limit the degradation and the will to 
claim political responsibility.121 However, once situation is bad enough, there is no choice any 
more: states must act in order to save their environment, including coastal areas, high seas, 
islands, archipelagos as sensitive regions, maritime environment of the territorial waters, etc.. 
The environmental situation, on the other hand, influences also the societies, tourism and 
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economies of the coastal states, and therefore it is in the interests of the coastal states to protect 
the sea. 
A similar thing happened to the Baltic Sea already at the end of the 1960s: states around 
the Baltic Sea lacked both capacity and will to cooperate politically or start solving the 
environmental problems of their common sea, but the Baltic Sea was also politically divided sea 
as there was the Iron Curtain between the east and west coast of the sea. However, the Helsinki 
Convention was an exception in that unfriendly political environment where states were dealing 
only with their national interests and military capacity, but not with soft political issues like 
environment. In a way, the Helsinki Convention was a step towards the end of East-West 
division in the Baltic Sea Region. 
According to Egbert Tellegen, the Baltic Sea is the most trans-boundary sea between 
Eastern Europe and Western Europe, and abatement of transnational pollution of the Baltic Sea 
was recognized as a common interest of both Western and Eastern European countries 
surrounding the Baltic Sea at the beginning of the 1970s.122 Therefore, in 1974 the countries 
surrounding the Baltic Sea (Denmark, Finland, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Polish People’s Republic, Sweden, and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics) were able to sign the Helsinki Convention on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of Baltic Sea. What was the meaning of this convention and why did states sign 
that, is an important question. 
First of all, this was a process of institutionalization of an international environmental 
regime in the context of the Cold War: as the environment of the Baltic Sea needed protection 
and the sea is not owned by any of the coastal states, this was an appropriate situation for 
building a comprehensive international environmental regime in the Baltic Sea Area.123 Also, the 
situation of the 1970s was slightly different from the situation of the early Cold War during the 
1950s: significant progress had been made in so-called German question and border disputes 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland, and finally, as environmental issues 
started to be in the political agendas all around the world, also the idea of an international 
environmental conference and multilateral agreement on the pollution of the Baltic Sea was 
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realized in the early 1970s.124 During late 1960s and early 1970s sovereign states in the Western 
world established several international environmental regimes of marine protection in order to 
solve the problem of environmental degradation.125 For instance, the Oslo Convention, the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), and the Paris 
Convention were established at the beginning of the 1970s. For example, MARPOL (1973) was 
adopted as a result of numerous tanker accidents at the seas during the years of 1976 and 1977, 
and it aimed at preventing and minimizing pollution from ships, including both accidental 
pollution and pollution from routine operations.126 
However, what was the meaning of multilateral agreement named the Convention on the 
Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area in the international system of the 
Cold War in the Baltic Sea Region? Was it an extraordinary achievement, did it fulfill the 
expectations, or was it just a marginal victory. Or, was it a first step in the long process of further 
mutual cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region? Was it a success story in spite of the fact that 
environmental degradation of the Baltic Sea was not stopped? 
According to James Gustave Speth and Peter M. Haas, international environmental 
treaties are referred to as multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) which can take the 
form of broad conventions or more specific and typically action-oriented protocols or they can 
also codify or advance international law in a broad or specific area like the Law of the Sea.127  
According to Speth and Haas, those treaties or conventions, once they are ratified by 
governments, are sometimes referred to also as international environmental regimes, but the 
regime concept is wider and used also more broadly than just a treaty or convention.128 
What does a treaty or convention mean for a state? According to Speth and Haas, another 
distinction which is important in international law, is the difference between signing and 
ratifying a treaty. Usually, major treaties and amendments to treaties typically require ratification 
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by contracting governments: ratification is a process where the domestic legislation or rule-
making body approves the treaty and converts it to domestic law, but these processes underscore 
that adoption of treaty commitments is voluntary and does not entail any sacrifice of national 
sovereignty. The last point is reinforced by the fact that contracting parties can leave a treaty at 
any time if they want.129 However, when a government signs a treaty, it merely indicates 
preliminary support for the commitments written in the treaty.130 
This leads to the question of the importance of the Helsinki Commission for state 
behavior in the context of the Cold War. The Helsinki Convention was ratified by all the coastal 
states of the Baltic Sea not before 1980, whereas the Helsinki Commission as an 
intergovernmental organization and governing body of the Helsinki Convention was established 
already in 1974.131 The fact that states around the Baltic Sea were able to form an 
intergovernmental organization was a proof that further cooperation between them is supported. 
On the one hand, the Helsinki Convention was an achievement in the period it was 
signed: it was unique in its comprehensive approach to protection of the marine environment.132 
The Helsinki Convention (1974) prescribed the general attitude how the Baltic Sea states should 
or are recommended to deal with the Baltic Sea as common resource: 
“The Contracting Parties shall individually or jointly take all appropriate legislative, 
administrative or other relevant measures in order to prevent and abate pollution and to protect 
and enhance the marine environment of the Baltic Sea Area.”133 
According to Anne Christine Brusendorff, the Helsinki Convention of 1974 provided the 
basis for later environmental improvements of the Baltic Sea by the Helsinki Commission. The 
work of the Helsinki Commission after the ratification of the Helsinki Convention increased and 
deepened scientific knowledge of the state of the Baltic Sea and collected knowledge of the 
factors affecting the state of the sea, collected data, served as provider of supportive information 
to decision-makers (governments), focused on the prevention of all sorts of pollution from ships 
and co-operation in case of accidents at sea, encouraged regional cooperation, and made 
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recommendations limiting or eliminating the use of specific substances recognized as harmful to 
marine ecosystems.134 
However, one could ask how was it possible that states around the Baltic Sea in the 
suspicious and paranoid context of the Cold War were able to cooperate in the field of 
environmental protection while they were not so successful in other types of cooperation: in the 
fields of economy, transportation and education (science and research), for example. 
According to Alexander L. George, the way in which leaders of nation-states view each 
other is of fundamental importance in determining what happens in relations among states.135 
Therefore, as Finland was the key actor in emphasizing environmental issues in the Baltic Sea 
Region also the Soviet Union as military superpower saw environmental cooperation as a new 
challenge in the Baltic Sea Region. One can even argue that the Soviet Union used 
environmental issues as a new tool of power politics in the Baltic Sea Region.136 The Convention 
was drafted and signed against the general context of Cold War rivalry in the Baltic Sea 
Region.137 This paradox can be explained by the fact that emphasis of the Helsinki Convention 
was on neutral issues in the context of political atmosphere of the Cold War: environment affects 
every state, is it weak or strong state, communist or capitalist state, Eastern or Western 
(European) state. 
On the other hand, the Helsinki Convention had limited capacity: the convention did not 
play the key role in the Baltic Sea Region during the Cold War period, and environmental gains 
of the Helsinki Commission were rather modest during the 1970s and 1980s as regards real 
actions: differences between contracting parties of the convention, violations, etc. 
According to Tellegen, before the fall of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern 
Europe in 1991, common efforts to protect the Baltic Sea were limited mainly to the prevention 
of pollution by ships: for instance, the protection of national sovereignty and state secrecy 
hindered inclusion of land-based activities and inland waters surrounding the Baltic Sea as also 
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sources of pollution – the inclusion of land-based and inland water pollution was particularly 
resisted by the Soviet Union and probably there were certain reasons for that.138 
The Helsinki Convention (1974): 
“While the provisions of the present Convention do not apply to internal waters, which 
are under the sovereignty of each Contracting Party, the Contracting Parties undertake, without 
prejudice to the sovereign rights, to ensure that the purposes of the present Convention will be 
obtained in these waters.”139 
Also, the Helsinki Convention was limited to the prevention of pollution by only certain 
type of ships (commercial vessels, passenger ships, etc.), whereas not including all ships (naval 
vessels, warships etc.): 
“The present Convention shall not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary, military aircraft 
or other ship and aircraft owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on 
government non-commercial service.”140 
The comprehensiveness of the Helsinki Convention was derived from the limited area 
that the Convention covered geographically and this enabled states to focus only on solving 
complex environmental problems.141 What this means is that the Helsinki Convention of 1974 
was not aimed at solving local and specific regional environmental problems (for instance, waste 
water treatment in Kaliningrad oblast or in Saint Petersburg), but rather more comprehensive, 
and unfortunately more blurred international environmental and maritime problems like safety 
and pollution which are more general by nature. The Convention was not specific, but 
comprehensive, in both negative and positive way. Positive aspect would be that it supported 
cooperation between states around the sea: 
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“Although the Convention established internationally legally binding obligations to be 
undertaken by each Member State, it primarily created the legal basis for a close and permanent 
co-operation among the Member States.”142 
Negative aspect is that the Helsinki Convention was rather blurred than focusing on the 
specific problems of the sea, like waste-water treatment of urban areas or industrial waste from 
coastal industries. It was more convenient for states to focus on general issues. 
According to Speth and Haas, some international environmental regimes addressing 
marine pollution, ocean dumping and whaling have had considerable success, but in international 
environmental regimes concerning protection of marine fisheries rather economic interests 
routinely trump good and neutral science.143 
This leads us to the question of the effectiveness of the Helsinki Convention as an 
environmental regime. What would have happened without the Convention? According to Speth 
and Haas, on measuring regime effectiveness, the conceptual framework starts with three levels 
of accomplishments: first, what the situation would have been without the environmental regime, 
for second, what is the actual performance obtained under the environmental regime, and what is 
the best result that could be accomplished. The difference between the situation without the 
regime and actual performance obtained under the regime is a measure whether environmental 
regimes matter.144 
According to Anne Christine Brusendorff, the Helsinki Commission has produced many 
environmental gains over the past thirty years (recommendations, monitoring, science)145 – 
because of that one can assume that the situation without the environmental regime would have 
been much worse than it is today, there would be no recommendations or regulations, and 
therefore, it would be only up to environmental awareness and responsibility of every single state 
how to protect the vulnerable marine environment. 
At the beginning of the current part of the analysis, two main questions were formed: 
how the Cold War influenced the formation of the environmental regime of the Helsinki 
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Convention and how much the Helsinki Commission has been influencing the environmental 
governance of the Baltic Sea Region. In sum, the paradox of the Cold War was that, on the one 
hand, the political situation did not support the political cooperation  as regards the German 
question and the Soviet Union as a closed and isolated system, but on the other hand the Cold 
War was a good soil for starting the international environmental cooperation and launching an 
environmental regime – the environmental issues were neutral issues and international 
cooperation was possible mainly based on such kind of issues (not, for example, so much on 
economic issues). 
Many factors influenced the work of the Helsinki Commission in the early days. The 
Helsinki Convention had limited capacity as the political climate of the Cold War was 
determined by hard realist politics (convention did not apply to warships) and states were not 
legally forced to fulfill the purposes of the Helsinki Convention. The Helsinki Convention was 
not ratified by all states before 1980: a treaty enters into force only after the ratification after the 
ratification.146 However, the intergovernmental organization called the Helsinki Commission 
was formed already in 1974. 
The Helsinki Convention was a basis for a more efficient international environmental 
regime in coming decades. It set a course for the environmental policy and international 
environmental governance in the Baltic Sea Region already before the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. In a way, the Helsinki Convention was a unique achievement at the time it was signed 
and ratified by the coastal states of the Baltic Sea. It formed an environmental regime which 
aimed at protecting an entire sea from pollution. The role of the environmental regime can be 
viewed as decisive in the international and environmental cooperation of the Baltic Sea area. 
Without the regime the situation of the Baltic Sea would be worse. 
The work of the Helsinki Commission was rather a political process than a process 
caused by environmental awareness of states like the Soviet Union: how much did the Soviet 
Union pay attention to environmental problems? Actions of different states were caused by their 
perceptions of the political environment in the Baltic Sea Region: as environment seemed to be a 
neutral international issue, hostile states in the context of the Cold War on the opposite shores of 
                                                          
146 Speth and Haas, 84 
47 
 
the Baltic Sea were able to cooperate in the field of environment whereas there are no other good 
examples of cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region among states in the Cold War climate of the 
1970s. 
 
 
3.2 New Political Situation 
 
This section of the analysis focuses on the environmental regime of the Baltic Sea Region 
during the 1990s, based on a renewed and revised Helsinki Convention. What were the impacts 
of the new political situation on the international environmental governance in the Baltic Sea 
Region? How to estimate the effectiveness of the Helsinki Commission during the new era? 
Once the communism collapsed and the Iron Curtain between the East and the West disappeared, 
the situation was appropriate for a better cooperation, but also for increased prosperity, economic 
growth and increased human impact on the marine environment. 
At the beginning of the 1990s a new era in the history of the Helsinki Commission was 
launched, caused by political changes in Europe: the emergence of new independent states on the 
eastern shore of the Baltic Sea (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), the collapse of communism in 
Eastern Europe (Poland, Baltic States), the reunification of Germany, and developments in 
international environmental and maritime law which led to the increased environmental 
awareness in the world more generally.147 
This new political situation led to a revised Helsinki Convention (1992), signed by states 
bordering the Baltic Sea and the European Commission. The new version of the Helsinki 
Convention led to the changed role, effectiveness and significance of the Helsinki Commission 
as an intergovernmental organization and governing body of the Helsinki Convention. 
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According to Brusendorff, the new era of the Helsinki Commission is characterized by 
new principles and approaches of the work of the Helsinki Commission since 1992:148 
1) The expansion of the area of the work of the Helsinki Commission, or so-called 
“Convention Area” – in addition to the Baltic Sea itself also the inland waters became 
subject to the marine environmental protection 
2) The expansion of the area in which the coastal countries of the Baltic Sea are 
committed to implement the provisions of the Helsinki Convention and pertinent 
Recommendations, or so-called “Area of Application” – in addition to the sea area the 
area of application was enlarged to include also the catchment area 
3) A recognition of the need to mobilize financial resources and increase cooperation 
and co-ordination between the Helsinki Commission and international financial 
institutions – the work of the Helsinki Commission was expanded to include not only 
the coastal countries of the Baltic Sea, but also the countries in the catchment area of 
the Baltic Sea, including Belarus, Ukraine, the Czech Republic and Slovakia: an 
approach was taken that use pre-feasibility studies to identify pollution hot-spots and 
insure this identification would lead to the design of projects capable of attracting 
funding. 
4) The expansion of the work of the Helsinki Commission to cover also nature 
conservation, biodiversity issues and sustainable use of the natural resources of the 
Baltic Sea Area as parts of the area of the Helsinki Convention 
5) The shift towards a sector-wise approach to address also land-based pollution from 
point and diffuse sources and a change towards promoting best available techniques 
and best environmental practices rather than setting limit values 
6) The change in the work of the Helsinki Commission on land-based pollution sources, 
the emphasis was now placed on the harmonization of measures with those taken in 
the European Union and the similar organizations, like the sister organization of the 
Helsinki Commission in North-East Atlantic Ocean, the OSPAR Commission. 
These changes in the work of the Helsinki Commission during the 1990s, on the other 
hand, characterize the ineffectiveness of the older version of the Helsinki Convention and the 
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former work of the Helsinki Commission. According to Speth and Haas, there are many 
impediments to effective international environmental cooperation, but those impediments should 
not be viewed fatalistically, but critically – as pointing to corrective actions on the environmental 
and political front that are needed.149 The Helsinki Convention of 1992 is an example of the 
political will of contracting parties to improve the effectiveness of the current environmental 
regime. The environmental regime was expanded according to the new political situation on the 
eastern shore of the Baltic Sea, and according to the environmental degradation of the Baltic Sea. 
According to Speth and Haas, effectiveness of international environmental regimes has 
been widely studied – academics and scholars all around the world have sought to identify 
factors that contributed to enlarged international environmental cooperation and environmental 
protection.150 According to Speth and Haas, effective international regimes are those regimes 
that lead nations to make policy changes that support the goals of the regimes, leading to the 
results which indicate that there are improvements in environmental quality.151 For instance, if 
the Helsinki Convention would have led the Russian Federation to make policy changes that 
would support the goals of the Helsinki Convention in Kaliningrad the work of the Helsinki 
Convention would be regarded as more successful and efficient than it is now. 
It is important to mention that the regime does not force states to solve a problem. 
However, during the 1990s the Helsinki Commission launched certain goals which were 
supposed to be the basis for policy changes in environmental issues: for instance, countries 
around the Baltic Sea agreed on the Baltic Sea Joint Comprehensive Environmental Action 
Program in 1992 which had six broad goals:152 
1) Establishment of a long-term environmental management framework in each country 
of the Baltic Sea Region 
2) Institutional strengthening, human resource development in the Baltic Sea Region 
3) Launching a program for infrastructure investment in specific measures to control 
point and non-point sources of pollution and to minimize and dispose of wastes 
4) Management of coastal lagoons and wetlands 
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5) Supporting applied research to build the knowledge base needed to develop solutions 
6) Encouraging public environmental awareness and education 
While these goals did not cause a policy change immediately, a new course was set for 
policy change. Oran R. Young points out that the disappearance of the problem that led to the 
formation of environmental regime does not justify the conclusion that the regime had no effect 
at all.153 But if an environmental regime does not solve a problem at all the regime cannot be 
regarded as effective either. Based on Young, the following questions are important as regards 
the effectiveness of an international regime: “Do regime members take vigorous steps to 
implement regime rules or commitments within their domestic jurisdiction? Do states or subjects 
operating under their auspices comply with regime rules or live up to the commitments they 
make in creating regimes?”154  
According to the statements of the officials of the Helsinki Commission, the work of the 
Helsinki Commission has had many impacts on the environmental governance of the Baltic Sea 
after the Cold War. According to Brusendorff, the encouraging results and achievements of the 
Helsinki Commission include the following examples:155 
1) All in all, the degradation of the Baltic Sea has slowed – in fact, one has to take into 
account also economic growth in the Baltic Sea Region after the collapse of 
communism and ask what would have happened without the environmental regime 
2) Many positive improvements in the state of the marine environment of the Baltic Sea 
have been observed lately by scientists and scholars 
3) The Helsinki Commission has been working through 200 Recommendations thanks to 
which coastal countries have significantly reduced discharges of organic pollutants 
and nutrients 
4) Overall reduction in the emissions of oxygen-consuming substances has been 
achieved since the early 1990s 
5) Many hot spots have been eliminated: 81 out of the 162 major pollution hot spots in 
the Baltic Sea have been successfully eliminated since 1992 
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6) Special legislation to prevent pollution from ships has been developed by the Helsinki 
Commission, including measures to eliminate illegal discharges by ships into the 
Baltic Sea and to ensure navigation safety 
7) The Helsinki Commission has established joint monitoring of the state of the marine 
environment and carried out regular assessments as a precondition for evaluating the 
need for new protection measures: in fact, how do we know about the environmental 
state of the sea if there is no monitoring and information 
These achievements of the Helsinki Commission are examples of effectiveness and 
achievements of the work of the Helsinki Commission after 1992. The new Helsinki Convention 
was signed as a result of the changes in Europe: the political climate had improved in the Baltic 
Sea Region, there was appropriate soil for increased environmental cooperation, and states had 
motives to cooperate. Speth and Haas state that examples of effective environmental regimes are 
those where the environment is confidently believed to be improved or on the path of 
improvement, including stratospheric ozone regime, the European acid rain treaty, efforts to 
protect the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, international protection of Antarctic living resources, 
the regulation of ocean dumping and marine pollution from ships, whereas examples of 
ineffective environmental regimes include regimes where the results are more disappointing, like 
deforestation in Indonesia, management of toxic substances and nitrogen pollution.156  
Once it is known what conditions, factors and initiatives further the effectiveness of 
international environmental regimes states will know where to invest money and political will 
for better results.157 The new Helsinki Convention (1992) was an example how the goals of the 
Helsinki Commission were applied to the new political situation: there was no fear of major 
conflict any more between states around the Baltic Sea, environmental degradation became more 
important than hard politics of nation-states and it was up to states how to save the sea. 
On the other hand, while the Helsinki Commission has been able to improve the 
environment of the Baltic Sea from some aspects (listed above), and can be regarded and 
classified as successful international environmental regime, the Helsinki Convention has been 
unable to solve other severe environmental problems of the Baltic Sea. For instance, nutrient 
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pollution in the Baltic Sea region has remained a serious and unsolved environmental problem 
and important political issue already since the late 1980s when the 50 % reduction target for 
nutrient input was set up.158 Also, environmental degradation may be caused by economic 
growth.159 How is the environmental regime supposed to act as an impediment to economic 
growth? 
In sum, a new and revised Helsinki Convention signed in 1992 changed the role of the 
Helsinki Commission as an environmental policy-maker in the Baltic Sea Region: this 
intergovernmental organization became considerable international body with first remarkable 
achievements. Also, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of communism on the 
eastern shore of the Baltic Sea there was an appropriate political situation in the Baltic Sea 
Region to expand and enlarge the area of the Helsinki Convention, the meaning of pollution and 
the political responsibility of states around the Baltic Sea. 
The change of the work of the Helsinki Commission enabled states around the Baltic Sea 
to cooperate and coordinate their environmental policies more efficiently than before. However, 
the environmental degradation was not stopped as shipping, industries, and agriculture still had 
impact on the environmental degradation of the Baltic Sea. 
All in all, the role and work of the Helsinki Commission during the time changed, as did 
the political situation in the Baltic Sea Region. In the context of political changes, a new Helsinki 
Convention led to extended role of the Helsinki Commission in the Baltic Sea Region. 
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3.3 Environmental Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region after the Enlargement of 
the European Union 
 
The current part of the analysis focuses on an environmental regime in the Baltic Sea 
Region formed after 2004 based on the enlargement of the European Union – eight out of nine 
states in the Baltic Sea Region formed the group of states which had similar goals as regards 
environmental governance of the Baltic Sea and belonged also to the Helsinki Commission. 
 
As already mentioned before, there are many ways how to evaluate the effectiveness of 
an environmental regime: Oran R. Young maintains that limited approach to effectiveness of an 
environmental regime focuses on the extent to which the regime succeeds in solving the problem 
that leads to the formation of the regime.160 This kind of approach is limited as it does not pay 
attention to other aspects of the regime: for example, controlling situation can be also an 
achievement and a purpose in itself. An environmental regime may have managed to avoid major 
environmental or shipping disasters in a region, as a result of increased monitoring and maritime 
safety regulations. For example, in spite of the fact that there are still signs of environmental 
degradation of the marine environment of the Baltic Sea, there have been no severe oil disasters 
in the Baltic Sea Region during previous decade(s). 
Another way to evaluate the effectiveness is to focus on behavioral consequences of the 
international environmental regime – namely, how regimes play a role in shaping or guiding the 
behavior of those who are formal members of the international regime (governments and states), 
international agencies, interest groups and also individuals.161 However, regimes are only one of 
number of forces that shape the behavior of states.162 For instance, there may be also other issues 
at stake, including security and energy policy which may lead to policy change or environmental 
awareness. 
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The current part of the analysis is based on the assumption that the governments of 
nation-states as principal actors in making international environmental policy respond to pressure 
from a number of external and internal forces, like other nations, the work of the United Nations, 
international organizations (the European Union, the Helsinki Commission), NGOs (non-
governmental organizations), and nation-states’ own business sectors and domestic factors.163 
Because of that, international environmental politics can be regarded as a two-level game where 
one playing field is domestic politics and the other international politics.164 
Once Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland joined the European Union, a club of Baltic 
EU Member States included almost all the Baltic Sea Region, leaving Russia the only 
contracting party of the Helsinki Convention not belonging to the European Union. The 
enlargement of the European Union led to a completely new political situation in the Baltic Sea 
Region: the large area of the Baltic Sea and its catchment area became covered by the EU 
regulations, directives and marine strategy.165 Also, some decision-making powers were directly 
delegated to Brussels and Baltic Sea Region states had to contribute to implement EU 
regulations.166 This is a clear example how the European Union had strong impact on state 
behavior in the Baltic Sea Region as regards environmental policy and cooperation. The work of 
the European Union became a contributory factor to the international environmental governance 
of the Baltic Sea Region and formation of a new environmental regime, based on European 
Union regulations and directives which coordinated also the work of the Helsinki Commission. 
How to estimate the effectiveness of this environmental regime compared to the environmental 
regime of the 1990s and the environmental regime based on the first draft of the Helsinki 
Convention (1974)? 
According to Speth and Haas, there are many factors which lead to more effective 
international environmental regimes, including cooperative political factors which make it easier 
for states to reach meaningful agreements (groups of states, blocs of countries, and negotiations), 
capacity constraints (environmental technology), and heightened national concern (media, public 
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opinion) which also pressures governments to take stronger actions on the international 
environmental issues.167 
When states around the Baltic Sea entered the European Union, they became a bloc of 
countries in the European Union with a common sea – the Baltic Sea. As a result of that they 
became countries with similar environmental awareness, interests, attitudes and political will to 
act in a certain way. The Baltic Sea environmental regime (the work of the Helsinki 
Commission) was supported by the directives of the European Union. For instance, one of the 
important goals of the Helsinki Commission is to reduce human induced eutrophication to 
desirable levels, but similar goals and principles has also the EU Water Framework Directive as 
regards the coastal waters of the Baltic Sea.168 Also, the Helsinki Commission works in 
accordance with the EU Common Agricultural Policy as regards the impact of agriculture as one 
of the most important environmental problems of the Baltic Sea. Special characteristics of the 
Baltic Sea marine environment are fully accounted for in maritime and environmental politics of 
the European Union: for instance, European Marine Strategy foresees an Action Plan for each 
eco-region of the European Union.169 Accordingly, on the 15th of November 2007, the HELCOM 
Baltic Sea Action Plan was adopted in Krakow, Poland where states agreed to more specific 
actions to achieve a good environmental status of the Baltic Sea by 2021. 
The HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan differed from previous environmental activities 
and programs of the Helsinki Commission on three main points:170 
1) The expansion of stakeholders who had an active role in the work of the Helsinki 
Commission in the drawing up of the HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan: in addition 
to governments, also international organizations, NGOs, and individual citizens were 
supposed to take part in forming the plan 
2) This time the Helsinki Commission defined governments’ common vision of a 
healthy Baltic Sea by using ecological objectives for the Baltic marine biodiversity, 
combating eutrophication, curbing inputs of hazardous substances and ensuring 
maritime safety 
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3) The HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan was implemented via targeted and cost-
effective measures 
According to the HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan (2007), the overall goal of the 
Helsinki Commission is to keep Baltic Sea unaffected by eutrophication – a major problem of 
the Baltic Sea already since 1900 as the Baltic Sea has changed from an oligotrophic clear-water 
sea into a eutrophic marine environment.171 
In the frames of the HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan, the Helsinki Commission adopted 
the following goals and ecological objectives in order to describe the characteristics of the Baltic 
Sea: concentrations of nutrients close to natural levels, clear water, and natural levels of algal 
blooms, natural distribution and occurrence of plants and animals, and natural oxygen level.172 
On the other hand, the wider goal of the HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan was to stress the 
further need to co-ordinate and harmonize the work of the Helsinki Commission within the 
HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan to initiatives at the international level, including the EU 
Marine Strategy Directive, the EU Maritime Policy and the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian 
Federation.173 
The HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan emphasized that the general state of the Baltic Sea 
can only be improved through combined efforts and integrated actions.174 The plan emphasizes 
also the cooperation between science and policy. 
According to Speth and Haas, two characteristics of the international organizations can 
influence outcomes of the international environmental regimes and the willingness of contracting 
parties to cooperate:175 
1) Horizontal linkages: these refer to overlapping memberships in organizations or 
regimes in which countries are members: for instance, the European Union is dense 
with horizontal linkages and therefore EU member states are more likely to comply 
with EU directives and norms and environmental treaties when those treaties become 
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part of EU commitments, as is the case with the Helsinki Commission and its 
environmental treaties 
2) Vertical linkages: these refer to broadly accepted international norms that can be 
applied to govern state behavior in particular domains: for instance, if environmental 
issues are conducted under the auspices of United Nations Environmental Programme 
(UNEP) or International Maritime Organization (IMO), or even EU Maritime Policy, 
then those norms of environmental protection and sustainable development will be 
accorded higher priority, and the environmental protection will be more effective 
After the enlargement of the European Union, when Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Poland became full member states of the European Union, the environmental governance of the 
Baltic Sea Region became influenced by the policy of the European Union. This fact helps to 
reevaluate the wider role and importance of the European Union in the Baltic Sea Region and the 
effectiveness of the environmental regime based on the European Union. What would be if there 
would not be the European Union? How the environmental governance would be conducted 
without the European Union? 
Based on Oran R. Young, there are three types of regime consequences: outputs, 
outcomes and impacts.176 The outputs are regulations, programs and organizational arrangements 
that actors establish to operationalize the provisions of a regime, moving from words to deeds.177 
The outcomes include changes in the behavior of members of regime (for example, states of the 
European Union in the Baltic Sea Region), and impacts are effects and solutions of problems.178 
For instance, the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region is an example of output. The 
European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region was launched in 2009, concerning the eight 
member states bordering the Baltic Sea and catchment area of the Baltic Sea: 
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 “The Strategy covers the macro-region around the Baltic Sea. The extent depends on the 
topic: for example on economic issues it would involve all the countries in the region, on water 
quality issues it would involve the whole catchment area, etc.”179 
What was the impact of the EU strategy for the Baltic Sea Region on the environmental 
cooperation in the Baltic Sea area? What was the role and meaning of the strategy? As the Baltic 
Sea has been basically an ‘inland sea’ of the European Union since 2004, with the exception of 
Russian territories, environmental governance of the Baltic Sea becomes gradually unified over 
the whole region in accordance with the guidelines of the EU environmental policy.180 
According to Yrjö Haila, unification of environmental policy is a process with two different 
impacts. On the one hand, unification of environmental policy helps to assess environmental 
problems and integrate environmental goals within other sectors of public policy.181 On the other 
hand, environmental policy is made up of highly heterogeneous set of specific environmental 
problems (like eutrophication, waste-water treatment), and at some level of resolution, also 
differentiation of policy instruments and differentiation of ways of implementation may be 
necessary.182 
The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region has become the major way in which the 
European Union relates to the Baltic Sea environment, altering relations in and among other 
institutional actors.183 According to Rikard Bengtsson, macro-regional strategies have become 
one of the catchwords of contemporary European Union debate.184 
The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region is built around four pillars:185 
A. To make the Baltic Sea an environmentally sustainable place through reducing 
nutrient inputs, preserving natural zones and biodiversity, reducing the use of 
hazardous substances, promoting clean shipping and mitigating climate change 
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B. To make the Baltic Sea Region a prosperous place through removing hindrances 
to the internal market, exploiting the full potential of the region in research and 
innovation and promoting entrepreneurship 
C. To make the Baltic Sea Region an accessible and attractive place through 
improving transport links, education, tourism and health in the region 
D. To make the Baltic Sea a safe and secure place through improving maritime 
safety and security and reinforcing protection from major emergencies at sea 
The most important challenge of them is environment and particular attention is given to 
the impacts of the excess nutrients leading to eutrophication, but the strategy pays attention also 
to the sustainability of transport modes and to other issues, like accessibility and attractiveness of 
the Baltic Sea Region. 
The work of the European Union in the matters of the Baltic Sea as a multinational region 
encourages cooperation among different multilateral cooperation structures and networks in the 
Baltic Sea Region, including the Northern Dimension, Council of the Baltic Sea States, Nordic 
Council of Ministers, the Helsinki Commission, Visions and Strategies around Baltic Sea 
(VASAB), Baltic Sea States Sub regional Cooperation. The European Union is also a mechanism 
which clarifies the roles and responsibility of different actors and stakeholders of environmental 
policy and international cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region, for example the implementing 
stakeholders of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, including National Contact Points 
(NCPs), Priority Area Coordinators (PACs), Horizontal Action Leaders (HALs), and Flagship 
Project Leaders (FPLs). In addition, the European Union encourages cooperation between these 
structures, stakeholders and Russian Federation.186 
Rikard Bengtsson points out several examples of progress, outcomes and impacts of the 
EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region: including projects in transport and energy sectors, such as 
“Cleanship”, “Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan”, “Baltic Transportation Outlook” and 
“BaltAdapt”. Based on Bengtsson, the EU Strategy is drawing together several independent 
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actors and serving as a platform for more effective and coherent policy development in the Baltic 
Sea Region.187 
According to the Council of the European Union, the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea 
Region “constitutes an integrated framework to address common challenges in the macro-region 
benefiting from strengthening co-operation between its stakeholders.”188 Also, based on the 
Council of the European Union, the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region is contributing to 
economic, social and territorial cohesion in the European Union, and accordingly in the Baltic 
Sea Region.189  
Based on Speth and Haas, a number of factors can improve the context which makes it 
easier to reach meaningful agreements and more effective environmental protection.190 Thus, the 
European Union has provided the political context and cooperative environment as being a factor 
leading to a more effective environmental regime in the Baltic Sea Region. Bengtsson maintains 
that, for example, the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region has in a short time period come to 
be perceived as the a way in which the European Union and its institutions and Baltic Sea states 
relate to each other.191 
According to Speth and Haas, another important factor leading to effective regime is 
national capacity, based on financial mechanism, knowledge and technology.192 Therefore, the 
structural funds of the European Union as the primary financial mechanism are also important 
contributory factor to political and environmental cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region.193 
However, as regards the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, the construction of the 
strategy is also based on close interaction with Russia, Belarus and other non-members of the 
European Union.194 This means that the European Union is working not only to strengthen 
relations between the countries which belong to the European Union as a Baltic club of EU 
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member states, but also as a bridge between those countries (involving former parts and 
influence sphere of the Soviet Union) and non-EU countries. This may lead to better 
environmental governance as in this framework states are more willing to protect the common 
sea. 
The environmental cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region after the enlargement of the 
European Union has been much more coordinated, strengthened, and motivated than before that. 
The European Union has produced many contributing factors to the cooperation among the 
Baltic Sea states as it serves as a basis for cooperation: 
1) The Baltic Sea has become an “inland sea” of an international organization, so this is 
the internal problem of this organization to be responsible for the good environmental 
status of the sea 
2) The goal of the Baltic Sea Region is now to be one of the leading regions in many 
issues: as regards maritime safety, security, attractiveness, sustainability, tourism and 
exploiting full potential of the region in research, science and innovation195 
3) The EU Strategy has contributed to restructuring institutional relations and tasks and 
multilateral cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region196 
4) The European Union has enhanced the dialogue with Russia in the Baltic Sea Region 
as states are not dealing with Russia separately 
5) The European Union has built a macro-region around the Baltic Sea which have led 
to increased cooperation among states which already had an environmental regime 
before (the Helsinki Commission), but which have lacked political will and 
coordination during the previous times 
6) The actions which show states’ mutual will to protect the environment and cooperate 
have grown significantly after the enlargement of the European Union in the Baltic 
Sea Region 
In sum, the environmental governance of the Baltic Sea Region after the enlargement of the 
European Union became more coordinated in accordance with the strategies and directives of the 
European Union. This refers to the impact of the European Union on the willingness and ability 
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of Baltic Sea states to protect the environment of a common sea. The effectiveness of the 
environmental regime built after the enlargement of the European Union has been based on the 
supportive network of the European Union in the Baltic Sea Region. While previous 
environmental regime, based on the Helsinki Convention, was quite limited especially before 
1992 during the Cold War, the environmental governance of the Baltic Sea under the auspices of 
the European Union has been much more successful in terms of cooperation.  
However, the European Union has increased also economic growth, prosperity’s and 
human impact on marine environment (car traffic, shipping, agriculture) in the Baltic Sea 
Region. On the other hand, the European Union supports clean shipping and new regulations in 
maritime policy and agriculture. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The current Master’s thesis has focused on the political cooperation and international 
environmental governance in the Baltic Sea Region, mainly since 1974 when an environmental 
regime, the Helsinki Commission, was formed. The environmental cooperation in the Baltic Sea 
Region has been based on the political situation for the time being. In order to analyze the 
effectiveness of an environmental regime, it is needed to take into account also the political 
situation – are there hostile and limited relationships among states or is there an international 
network which encourages different types of cooperation, including international environmental 
governance of a sea. On the one hand, the question is in responsibility of nation-states. On the 
other hand, effective protection of marine environment is determined by international 
cooperation. 
Empirical analysis was composed of three parts. The first part which focused on the 
emergence of an environmental regime in the Baltic Sea Region posed two issues: how this 
environmental regime was influenced by the political situation of the Cold War, and how did the 
regime influence the environmental cooperation. As regards what were the incentives of states to 
cooperate in the climate of the Cold War, a conclusion is that the environmental cooperation was 
rather a political process than caused by Green thoughts. Another conclusion is that limited 
environmental cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region during the Cold War was better option than 
no environmental regime at all: the Helsinki Convention of 1974 was a basis for further 
environmental cooperation, revised Helsinki Commission in 1992 and more effective 
environmental regime in the Baltic Sea Region based on that. 
The analysis of the environmental regime in the Baltic Sea Region during the 1990s 
focused on the role of the new political situation in the international environmental cooperation. 
The environmental governance of the Baltic Sea became more effective and the role and work of 
the Helsinki Commission expanded and enlarged (to catchment area, etc.). 
The last part of the analysis focused on the role of the European Union in building an 
environmental regime in the Baltic Sea Region. The situation in the Baltic Sea Region changed 
fundamentally after 2004 when Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland – three coastal states of the 
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Baltic Sea – joined the European Union. A new course was set in the Baltic Sea Region: the 
environmental governance became coordinated in accordance with the directives (EU Water 
Framework Directive), strategies (EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region) and policies (EU 
Maritime Policy) of the European Union. International environmental cooperation reached a new 
level according to which also the effectiveness of the environmental regime can be measured. On 
the one hand, the European Union produced many contributory factors to the environmental 
cooperation of the Baltic Sea. On the other hand, the economic growth, prosperity pollution and 
increased impact of agriculture after the enlargement of the European Union have also had 
impacts on the marine environment of the Baltic Sea. The Baltic Sea has not only become an 
internal sea of the European Union, it has become also an internal environmental problem of the 
European Union. 
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KOKKUVÕTE 
Poliitiline Koostöö ja Rahvusvaheline Keskkonnakaitse Läänemere Regioonis Pärast Teist 
Maailmasõda 
 
Antud magistritöö räägib poliitilisest koostööst ja piiriülesest keskkonnakaitsest Läänemere 
regioonis pärast Teist maailmasõda ning peamiselt alates 1970ndatest aastatest kuni praeguseni. 
Teema on uurimisväärne, sest Läänemere kui sisemere keskkonnaseisund on pidevalt 
halvenenud alates 1960ndate aastate lõpust. Läänemere riikide majandustel on olnud oluline roll 
mere reostamise tekitamisel ja suurendamisel: tihenev laevaliiklus, põllumajandus, 
tööstusreostus ja suurlinnade heitveed on olnud peamised mere seisundi pidevale halvenemisele 
kaasa aitavad tegurid. 
Ent Läänemere regioon on ainulaadne paljude asjaolude kokkulangevusest tulenevalt: 
ühelt poolt on Läänemeri tundlik merekeskkond – tegemist on suhteliselt madala ja vähese 
soolsusega sisemerega, mida eraldavad Atlandi ookeani normaalse soolsusega mereveest Taani 
väinad. Samal ajal on Läänemerd väga ulatuslikult reostatud tulenevalt majandustegevusest. 
Teisalt on poliitiline kaart Läänemere regioonis vaga killustunud, ümber mere on üheksa 
riiki, kus räägitakse üheksat erinevat keelt, on erinev majanduslik areng ja kultuuriline taust. 
Lisaks sellele on poliitiline situatsioon olnud Läänemere ümber sageli pidevas muutumises. 
Ajalooliselt on Läänemeri olnud riike liitev, aga ka eraldav: alates möödunud sajandi keskpaigast 
kuni 1990ndateni oli Läänemeri kaheks jagatud meri, kus koostööd riikide vahel takistas 
kuulumine poliitilistesse vastasleeridesse. 
Rahvusvaheline keskkonnaalane koostöö Läänemere regioonis on tuginenud poliitilisele 
koostööle, riikide keskkonnateadlikkusele ja rahvusvahelistele keskkonna-reziimidele: juba 
1974. aastal moodustati Läänemere keskkonnakaitsega tegelev rahvusvaheline 
keskkonnaorganisatsioon nimega Helsingi Komisjon. Tegemist on rahvusvahelise 
organisatsiooniga, mis tugineb oma tegevuses Helsingi Konventsioonile, mida on ajapikku 
uuendatud vastavalt poliitilise olukorra muutumisele Läänemere regioonis. 
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Antud magistritöö uuris, kuidas keskkonnaalane koostöö on edenenud ning millised 
poliitilised tegurid on seda mõjutanud. Selleks keskendus analüüs peamiselt kahele 
rahvusvahelisele organisatsioonile: Helsingi Komisjonile ja Euroopa Liidule. Mõlemad on 
edendanud olulist rolli keskkonnaalase koostöö arendamisel Läänemere piirkonnas. 
Magistritöö teoreetiline osa keskendub riikidevahelise keskkonnaalase koostöö ja 
keskkonna temaatika käsitlustele rahvusvaheliste suhete teoorias. Ühest küljest on riikide 
keskkonnapoliitika aluseks riikide endi keskkonnateadlikkus ja tahe keskkonda kaitsta, teisalt 
aga see, mil määral ollakse võimelised koosööd tegema ning moodustama rahvusvahelisi 
keskkonnarežiime, ning samuti see, millised faktorid on nende keskkonnarežiimide toimimise ja 
efektiivsuse aluseks. Rahvusvaheline keskkonnaalalne koostöö on meeskonnatöö, mille 
võtmeteguriks on riikide võime säilitada koostööks vajalikke võrgustikke. 
Antud magistritöö uurismisküsimus on, millised poliitilised tegurid (erinevad poliitilise 
koostöö vormid Läänemere regioonis pärast Teist maailmasõda) on toetanud poliitilist koostööd 
Läänemere keskkonna kaitsmisel.   
Magistritöö analüüs on jagatud kolmeks alapeatükiks: esimene alapeatükk uurib Helsinki 
Konventsiooni allkirjastamisega loodud rahvusvahelise keskkonna-režiimi teket ja arengut 
Külma Sõja suhteliselt vastuolulises kontekstis. Ühest küljest oli Külm Sõda poliitilist koostööd 
takistav, teisalt aga keskkonnaalast (poliitilist) koostööd soodustav, sest just sel ajal 
keskkonnateadlikkus rahvusvahelisel areenil kasvas. Riigid hakkasid senisest enam rõhku 
pöörama merereostuse ja rahvusvahelise keskkonnakaitse probleemidele, mida kajastasid 
rahvusvahelised konventsioonid ja keskkonnakaitse organisatsioonid. 
Samas oli Helsingi Komisjoni moodustamine tulenev ka poliitilistest protsessidest, mille 
eestvedajaks olid peamiselt Soome, Rootsi ja Taani ning mis aitasid ületada Külma Sõja aegset 
lõhet Läänemere regioonis suhteliselt neutraalsele keskkonnateemale tuginedes. Peamine 
järeldus, mis puudutab keskkonnakaitset Läänemere regioonis alates 1974. aastast, on see, et 
Helsingi Komisjon oli küll piiratud volitustega organisatsiooni, mida takistasid poliitilised ja 
juriidilised piirangud, kuid tegemist oli siiski olulise platvormiga edasistele keskkonnaalastele 
režiimidele Läänemere regioonis, millele keskenduvad teised analüüsi alapeatükid. 
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Teine analüüsi osa keskendub 1990ndate muutunud poliitilisele olukorrale Läänemere 
regioonis. Läänemere keskkonnakaitse muutus efektiivsemaks ja paremini korraldatuks, kuna 
kadusid poliitilised barjäärid, kuid teisalt suurenes ka merereostus tänu laevatamise 
intensiivistumisele ja väetiste ulatuslikumale kasutamisele mereäärses põllumajanduses. Peamine 
järeldus on, et tänu poliitilise olukorra muutumisele laienes tunduvalt ka Helsingi Komisjoni töö, 
hõlmates lisaks laevatamisest tulenevale reostusele nüüd juba ka ranniku- ja sisemaa reostust. 
Läänemere reostuse mõiste laienes ja rahvusvaheline koostöö hakkas kandma ka esimesi vilju, 
olgu ulatuslikum monitooring, suurenenud mereohutus (ohutusnõuete karmistumine) ning 
rahvusvaheline teadusalane koostöö vaid mõnedeks näideteks. 
Kolmas sektsioon analüüsist keskendub Euroopa Liidu laienemisega kaasnenud uue 
rahvusvahelise režiimi tekkimisele. Kuna Läänemeri muutus Euroopa Liidu laienemisega 2004. 
aastal sisuliselt Euroopa Liidu sisemereks, kus üksnes Venemaa jääb väljaspoole Läänemere 
Euroopa Liidu liikmesmaadest moodustunud klubi, siis muutus ka Läänemere keskkonnakaitse 
justkui Euroopa Liidu siseprobleemiks. Teisalt pole see ainult Euroopa Liidu siseprobleem, vaid 
jääb endiselt ka iga riigi probleemiks. Antud magistritöö vaatles, kuidas keskkonnapoliitika 
Läänemere umber muutus koordineerituks Euroopa Liidu strateegiate ja direktiivide poolt, mis 
on tekitanud riikides suuremat vastutustunnet keskkonna ees. Merekeskkonna kaitse on osa ka 
Euroopa Liidu merenduspoliitikast ja merenduse strateegiast. 
Asja teine aspekt on aga, et Euroopa Liidu laienemisega kaasnenud majanduskasv on 
osalt ka ise merereostusele kaasa aidanud. Seetõttu on Euroopa Liidu keskkonnapoliitika 
suunatud ka Euroopa Liidu enda majandustegevuse, moderniseerumise ja intensiivsema 
transpordi (laevaliiklus, autostumine) tekitatud reostusega võitlemisele. 
Kuid Euroopa Liidu keskkonnapoliitika Läänemere regioonis on samas ehe näide sellest, 
kuidas rahvusvaheline keskkonnakaitse on tänu ühele rahvusvahelisele organisatsioonile siiski 
palju efektiivsemaks muutunud, mille näideteks on Euroopa Liidu poolt kehtestanud nõuded 
Läänemerel sõitvate laevade mereohutuse ja laevakütuse keskkonnasäästlikkuse osas. 
